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GHAPTJSH I
INTBOIXJCTION
In the wake of the great war of 1914-1918, there
lingered in the minds of the American people that idealistic
and crusading spirit which, under the inspiring leadership
of Woodrow Wilson, had helped make the United States victor
ious in battle and which gave impetus to an unprecedented
endeavor to make secure the peace which followed.

Through

out much of the world at that time there was a strong desire
to prevent a repetition of the horror end devastation which
the late war had left behind it.
After the United States had entered this war, President
Wilson became the ardent and vociferous spokesman for a number
of principles which, many hoped, would be the basis for a
Just and lasting peace.

The last of his Famous Fourteen Points

was a declaration in favor of a "general association of nations"
by which such a peace might be maintained.

After the war was

over, the fruit of Wilson's labors in this direction was the
Covenant of the League of Nations, and from the latter part of
1918 to the presidential election of 1920j the controversy
over the Treaty of Versailles with this Covenant attached
occupied the uppermost position in American politics.
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Because the iUaerican people believed that they had
fought a war on behalf of a great cause, and because that
crusading spirit lingered in their minds for a while there
after, most of them seemed to favor participation in a
system by which such a cause might be realized.

This

idealism was not to last, but while it lived, no section
of the country was entirely immune to its effects.
Membership in the League of Nations, however, entailed
a number of responsibilities and obligations which, most
likely, many people did not at first take into account.

The

early enthusiasm over the idea perhaps blinded many people to
the reality that, in joining the League of Nations, the United
States would have, in some degree, to abandon such deep-rooted
traditions as isolation, the Monroe Doctrine, freedom from
"entangling alliances," and exemption from an active and posi
tive interest in the affairs of the rest of the world.
But if the majority of the people were not at first
aware of the implications of League membership, end if a
majority of them showed a real sympathy for the League as
Wilson wanted it, this was not the case in the United states
Senate.

This body, with its strong party allegiances, was

divided from the beginning on many issues.

During the de

bates over ratification of this treaty, many of its provisions
end implications became the objects of much declamation and
dissension.

Among other things, it was these differences

which divided the Senate into its factions, and it was the
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unyielding stand taken by these factions which presented
the crucial and unforceable barrier to ratification.
The Senate was divided into three distinct groups.
Those who were opposed to American entrance into any kind
of league constituted a small but impressive minority,^
mostly Republicans, and were known as the "irreoonoilables"
or "bitter enders."

They were extreme nationalists and

isolationists who firmly believed that the United states
should remain free from any "entangling alliances," and
that by joining the League of Rations, the United states
would lose the very nature of its sovereignty and indepen
dence.
The two main factions, however, about whose differ
ences the contest was centered, were the Administration
Democrats and the reservationists, both "mild" and "strong".
The Administration Democrats were those who generally
supported Wilson for unconditional ratification of the
treaty, and the reservationists were those senators,
practically all Republicans, who felt that reservetlonf;
of some sort to the Covenant were necessary adequately to
protect the vital interests of the United States.
There were some sections of the country whose
senators were generally united as representatives of one
of these factions in the senate.

This was particularly

^"Is Wilsonphobia to Defeat the League of Rations?"
Current Opinion. LXVI (June, 1919), 344.
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tru« of the South, which was solidly Democratic and de
cidedly pro-Wilson.

Many senators from the Northeast

were among those who represented a strong Republican
opposition to the League of Nations, and party sympathies
also prevailed among Republican senators from the Midwest.
There was one region, however, the far Northwest, extend
ing from the Red River of the North westward to the pacific
Ocean, whose senators presented a sharp diversity of
opinion.
The Northwest may be defined as the area which in
cludes the states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana,
Idaho, Wyoming, Washington and Oregon.

With the exception

of Oregon, which attained its statehood in 1853, these
states all entered the union at the same time (1889-1890),
and when they drew up their respective constitutions, a
number of common predispositions, economic and political,
produced fundamental similarities in the new state govern
ments.
Most of this vast area was semi-arid, and remained
for many years a sparsely populated and mainly agricultural
region.

Moreover, before the turn of the century the

frontier, with its free lands, had disappeared, so that
the chief preoccupations of the settlers thereafter were
directed to such things as reclamation and irrigation, and
to such kindred political movements as the Farmers*
Alliance, Populism, and other endeavors which were peculiar
to an aggressive end discontented agrarian society.
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Because of such preoccupations, and because of the
remoteness of the area, the people of the Northwest (as
well as those of other parts of the west) were generally
apathetic to American foreign policy end to what prevailed
across the oceans.

During the early days of the First

World War, therefore, these people were less apprehensive
over the outcome of that conflict than were people of
other parts of the country.

But when the United States

entered the war, the Northwest responded, as did the rest
of the country, and gave a spirited support to the American
cause and to their leader, Woodrow Wilson.

And in the

immediate aftermath of this conflict, the Northwest shared
with the greater part of the nation in the desire to join
the League of Nations.
The twelve Northwest senators who participated in
this great dispute included several of the most prominent
in the nation, both on the senate floor and in activities
2
outside.
But unlike their constituents, who seemed to be
more united in their sympathies, each of these men spoke
for himself or as a member of one of the contending fac
tions in the Senate.
The irreooncilebles, the Republicans who opposed
ratification of the treaty, perhaps constituted the most
outstanding group among the Northwest senators, for the
most famous and the most vociferous of all the members of

^Senators Kendrick of Wyoming and Chamberlain of
Oregon were not active in the League debates.
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the Senate was William E. Borah of Idaho.

Also Included

in this group were Miles Poindexter of Washington, who was
very prominent in Republican circles, and Asie J. Gronna
of North Dakota.

These men, including Borah with his

thunderous attacks, denounced any international organiza
tion which would in any degree obligate this country to
commitments with foreign powers, or which would in,any
way jeopardize America's complete freedom of action in its
international relations.

To each of them the League of

Nations was, for many reasons, an instrument of evil and
not of good.
The Administration Democrats, who were the direct
opponents of the irreconoilables, included Thomas J. Walsh,
a man of high ability, and Henry L. Myers, both of Montana,
John r. Nugent of Idaho and Edwin S. Johnson of South
Dakota.

These senators defended the League of Nations and

supported President Wilson in favoring ratification of the
Covenant as it stood.
The other groups, all Republicans, were the reser
vationists.

The strong reservationists included Thomas

Sterling of South Dakota, Francis E. Warren of Wyoming and
Wesley Jones of Washington.

The mild reservationists,

Charles L. MoNery of Oregon and Porter J. MoCumber of North
Dakota, were both ardent friends of the League and were
willing to ratify the treaty with reservations

,
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of a fflora Innocuous nature.^
Discounting the stand taken by the irreooncilables,
the debates on the League of Nations centered largely
about the question of whether the United States should
enter the League with limited obligations, and with a
firm hold (by reservations) on all Its traditional pre
rogatives, or whether the United States should accept the
restraints and obligations of a world order by ratifying
the Covenant which Itself sufficiently safeguarded American
Interests end policies.
The first event of national significance, the Impli
cations of which were In part responsible for the eventual
defeat of the League, was the Congressional elections of
1918.

These elections gave the Republicans a victory In
À
both houses and a majority of two In the Senate.
Whether
this shift In power was due to Wilson's rash October appeal
for a Democratic congress, or to what extent It was a re5
pudlatlon of Wilson himself, is problematical;
but of
some significance, aside from the bitter Republican

T h o m a s A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Be
trayal (New York, 1945), 57-58.
(hereafter referred to as
The Great Betrayal)
4
Denna Frank Fleming, The United states and the League
of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York, 1932), 51.
^Bailey, Woodrow Wilson end the Lost Peace (New York,
1944), 58-70.
(hereafter referred to as The Lost Peace)
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reverberations which followed the October

appeal,^

is the

fact that these elections were a direct reflection of
popular sentiments and predispositions of the time.

Though

the issues of the coming peace were to be of prime impor
tance for the next seventeen months, it is worth noting
that they were contested almost solely around domestic
questions— the host of grievances which arose out of the
7
"war-time dictatorship" of the Administration.
There was virtually no issue contested and pro
perly discussed which arose out of the policies
that were the cause of our entering the war, of
the degree of efficiency with which it was con
ducted, of the aims announced for the United States
by its official spokesman, or of the effort which
the United States was to put forth in the making
of a durable peace.°
In the Northwest, for example, the Nonpartisan
League was a strong force behind state and national
g
politics.
This was a farmers* organization whose chief
complaint was that the farmer had been slighted in the
distribution of the high profits which others had^ made
after the outbreak of the war in E u r o p e . F o u r of the

^Fleming, 35ff.; Charles P. Howland, American Foreign
Relations. 1928 (New Haven, 1928), 241-2.
^Howland, 239-40, 245.
Qlbid.. 245.
*Ibld.. 241.
^^Claudius 0. Johnson. Borah of Idaho (New York.
1936)* 210.
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northwest senators who were elected or reelected in 1918
were involved in issues in which the Nonpartisen League
was interested, and three of them received the direct
support of that organization.

In South Dakota, Thomas

Sterling, Republican, was elected with League support, and
in Idaho, Senators Nugent and Borah, Democrat end Republican
respectively, were both supported by the Nonpartisan League.
In MontansyThomas J. Walsh, Democrat, defended the domestic
policies of Woodrow Wilson end defeated both the Republican
and Nonpartisan candidates.

11

The restiveness and general discontent manifested at
this time is one indication that, in spite of the later mass
enthusiasm over the League of Nations, American foreign
policy was not to be the consuming interest of the people.
The implication is that even though many of the senators
elected at this time were to become very active in the de
bates over the League of Nations, their attitudes on such
subjects were not considered by the voters on election
day.12
The conduct of the President himself in the ensuing
weeks also had a bearing on the events which were to come.
A week after the Armistice, Wilson announced that he in
tended personally to attend the peace conference.

This

llRowland, 244. For a campaign speech of Walsh,
wherein he supports Wilson's policies, see Dally
Missoullan. November 3, 1918,
l^Rowland, 239, 294.
Peace. 65,

See also Bailey, The Lost
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unpreoadanted etep was greeted with all kinds of ooudeimations mainly by partisan Republicans.

For many reasons it

was contended that Wilson's place was at home.

The Repub

licans, for one thing, felt that the President had no
business speaking for the nation after he had been repudiated at the polls.

13

Also, many resented the hand-picked delegation
which Wilson chose to take with him.

Many also were un

impressed by the calibre of this group.

Republicans par

ticularly, accused Wilson of wanting ''rubber stamps" or
"yes men", and they were further infuriated because there
were no important representatives of their own party on
this delegation.

Then too, the Senate, which was to

prove very jealous of its prerogatives, was unwisely
neglected by Wilson when he deemed it improper to give
14
that body some representation at the conference.
The President departed for France early in December,
1918, end while he was there, another shortcoming served
to irritate sensibilities at home.

The first of his Pbur-

teen Points had promised "open covenants of peace openly
arrived at. • ."

But the closed-door diplomacy which

marked the sessions of the conference was a direct vio
lation of this doctrine, and the result was that Wilson's
enemies in the Senate had additional grounds for com-

l^Bailey, The Lost Peace. 71-78.
l^Ibid.. 87-104; Rowland, 247-50.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

11
plaint.
The first draft of the Covenant was published in
American newspapers on February 15, 1919, while Wilson was
1A
still at Paris.
He had requested that the Senate suspend
any action until he returned, but the Senate refused this
request with a vengeance, and senator Poindexter of
Washington announced publicly that he would make the first
attack on the covenant.

17

On the 19th of that month the

onslaught began, led, as expected, by Poindexter, and over the
days that followed, many more castigations were hurled at the
League, including one by Borah.
In the meantime, senatorial opponents of the League,^
operating outside the chamber, decided that strong measures
had to be taken as a positive indication that the Covenant
as it stood could not be accepted.

On March 3, at the in

stance of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts,
Republican leader in the Senate end chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, a resolution was drafted which has
since been known as the Round Robin.

It was signed, by

March 4, by thirty-nine Republican senators, including

1 Bailey, The Lost Peace. 125-33.
See for example,
the attitude of Senator Lodge on the secrecy of the confer
ence. Fleming, 115. See also William E. Borah, "The Perils
of Secret Treaty Making," Forum. LI (December, 1918), 657-8.
^^Fleming, 118. See for example. Daily Missoulien.
February 15, 1919.
17
Daily Missoulian. February 13, 1919.
^Qpieming, 121-52.
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from the Northwest, Gronna, Sterling, Borah, warren and Miles
Poindexter,^®

This resolution stated, first, that the signa

tories (sufficient in number to block ratification) could not
accept the Covenant in the form in which it was then proposed,
Moreover, it continued, if a resolution were introduced which
provided for the early conclusion of the peace and a later
consideration of a league of nations, they would vote for
that resolution.
The purpose of the Round Robin, as explained by Lodge,
was to remind the American people, and especially the states
men of Europe, that even though the President had negotiated
the Treaty of Versailles, the United States was by no means
bound by his actions.

It was to be made clear that the

United States Senate and that body alone was responsible for
the ratification of any treaty.

Moreover, he continued,

Europe should realize, in view of the late Republican victory
in Congress, that Woodrow Wilson was no longer powerful at
home, and that successful resistance of him by the Senate
could not be considered as an "act of bad faith."

20

President Wilson had returned to America on February
23, in order to attend the closing session of the Sixty-fifth

^ % e n r y Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of
Nations (New York, 1925), llSff. Lodge, however, lists only
thirty-eight signatories, including himself, but the com
plete list is found in Fleming, 154-5.

20

Lodge, 120-2.
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C o n g r e s s , D u r i n g hia short stay in this country, it beoame
increasingly clear to him that, in view of the strong oppo
sition in the Senate, and considering the implications of
the Round Robin, definite changes must be made in the Coven
ant in order that it stand any chance of ratification.

And

before he reached France for the second time, almost the
entire press of this country had agreed that amendments of
some sort were necessary.

22

In accordance with a number of suggestions made by
four eminent Republicans— William Howard Taft, Charles JSvans
Hughes, Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, five important
amendments (among others) were carried through by Wilson at
Paris.

First, the language of the Covenant was rewritten

with greater clarity.

In Article 1 a clause was inserted

which permitted a nation to withdraw from the League on two
years notice, provided that its international obligations
and its obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled.
Also, in Article 5, practically all decisions made by the
Council or the Assembly of the League were to require
unanimous concurrence by the members.

In Article 15, a

clause was inserted which excluded all domestic questions
from League jurisdiction, and in Article 21 the Monroe

21

Bailey, The Lost Peace. 194-5.

^Fleming, 172-3,
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Doctrine was specificelly recognized as a regional understanding not to be affected by anything in the Covenant.

23

With these and other changea made, the revised draft
of the Covenant was published in American newspapers on
April 28, 1919,^^ and formally presented to the Senate on
July 10 of that year.
Public opinion before the Covenant was revised seems
to have been wholeheartedly in favor of the League of Nations.
In June, after the finished product had met the public eye,
such sentiments persisted.
There can be no doubt where the American people
stand on this issue. Over half the state legisla
tures have passed resolutions favoring the idea of
the League of Nations. Both political parties have
planks in their platforms endorsing the ifea. The
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in /uaerica,
the American Federation of Labor, the National
Grange, and the Federation of V/omen*s Clubs, and
hosts of other national, state and local organiza
tions are all in favor of the project. There is

23

"Republican Contributions to the Covenant," Inde
pendent. XCVXII (May 24, 1919), 275, Ix)dge himself refused
to offer suggestions outright to Wilson, as he claimed that
he could not speak for the senate.
Fleming, 181. But when
William Howard Taft, an ardent friend of the League, spoke
personally with Wilson, just before the letter's second de
parture for France, he advised Wilson to amend the Covenant
in accordance with the "constructive parts" of a speech made
by Lodge.
Ibid.. 161, Taft also had urged Wilson to make
sure that the Covenant be “made an organic part of the treaty,
Ibid.. 160, Wilson, however, had had this in mind from the
Beginning. Bailey, The Lost Peace. 179-80.
24
Fleming, 196.
April 28, 1919,

Bee for example Daily Missoulian.

^®Lodge, 152.
^®Bailey, The Lost Peace. 203-4.
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15

apparently no formidable opposition to the Covenant out
side the United states S e n a t e . 27
The Northwest was well represented in this popular
support for the Covenant.

Over the months of the contro

versy many types of appeal endorsed the League of Nations
and declared themselves in favor of American participation.
Among the many farm organizations which endorsed the League
of Nations was the Nonpartisan League.

28

This organization

had, in 1913, a very strong control over the government of
North Dakota, 20,000 members in South Dakota, '19,000 in
Montana, 7,000 in Idaho and a "rapid growth in Washington."

29

Many committeemen of the League to Lnforce Peace (the organi
zation most responsible for the advertisement of the League
of Nations) were active in all seven Northwest states, and
30
each one was an eminent person in his own state.
Among
state organizations were the North Dakota Grangers and the
Women of the Northwest through the women* s Bureau of Social
rt-i
Equity of the Council of the Women Voters of Oregon,
Votes
taken by state members of the National Economic League dis-

27Hamilton Holt, "The Senate Versus the People," In
dependent, XGVIII (June 7, 1919), 351-2. For an analysis of
public opinion in the spring of 1919, see Ruhl J. Bartlett,
The League to .Enforoe Peace (Chapel Hill, 1944), 130-1.
BByhis and other petitions were printed in the Con
gressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 7481ff.
29
"Non-Partisan League," Bellman. XXIV (March 23,
1918), 314.
Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 7482-6.
31lbid.. 7486-7.
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olosed a majority in favor of the League of Nations in each
32
northwest state except Wyoming, where the vote was a tie.
And in a petition signed by representative citizens who were
chosen for their competence to speak for the sentiments of
their respective states, the Northwest was again well repre
sented by many eminent people who urged ratification without

delay,®®
Among the state legislatures to endorse the League of
Nations by concurrent resolution were those of Washington
and North Dakbta,^^

The legislature of Idaho, however,

opposed the League of Nations,

This body, in March, 1919,

declared itself unequivocally against a league in any form.®®
It also strongly attacked Wilson for his autocratic methods,
end his seeking to impose such a proposition on the American
people against their will.

It urged the United States Senate

to oppose ratification, in part, because thirty-seven senators
I» c

had previously declared themselves against it.

52lbid.. 4827-0.
®®Ibid.. 5363-5.
Current History. X (June, 1919), 509. The first
North Dakota resolution, March 3, 1919, was read into the
Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 49-50.
A second North Dakota resolution, December 10, 1919, was
also printed into the Congressional Record. 66 Congress,
2 Session, LIX, 1208.
35

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 132.
®®Referring, of course, to the Round Robin, Thirtyseven senators had signed this document on March 3, 1919,
but two more added their names the following day, making a
total of thirty-nine. See Lodge, 120; Daily Missoulian.
March 4, 1919.
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There Is no reason to suspect, judging from the strong
language of this resolution, that the Idaho legislature
changed its attitude as time went on.

The resolution was

passed, however, before the Covenant had been revised, and
before any real indication of public opinion had been dis
closed.
In any event, the general picture seemed favorable.
If the organizations and individuals could not speak for all
the people whom they were supposed to represent, yet as seen
by one analyst, there was apparently no hostile majority in
a single state.

38

In the Senate itself in June, 1919, the situation
also appeared propitious, at least on the surface.

Twelve

senators (the irreooncilables) declared themselves against
the League.
favor of it.

Twenty remained doubtful and sixty-four were in
39

The sixty-four who favored the.League con

stituted the required two-thirds majority for ratification,
60

that whatever the remaining "doubtful" senators chose to

do, no less than two-thirds, apparently, could be counted
upon to ratify the treaty.
Unfortunately for the treaty’s sake, however, these
sixty-four senators were not consistent, or rather they were

3?Bartlett, 130-1.
^^Ibid.. 130.
39
"Is Wilsonphobia to Defeat the League of Nations?"
Current Opinion. LI7I (June, 1919), 344.
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not united, when they maintained that they were in favor of
American entrance into the League of Nations.

After the

Covenant had been revised, there were many who claimed that
sufficient changes had not been made, or that those changes
which were made were unsatisfactory.
for the most part, It was the Democrats, the friends
of Wilson, who were convinced that the Covenant spoke for
Itself and that In Its final form it met with all the
objections previously raised.

At least one Republican,

MoNary of Oregon, had voiced satisfaction with the amended
Covenant,

40

and MeCumber of North Dakota was to Indicate

the same satisfaction In his speeches and In his voting.
But the bulk of the Republicans, whether for the League or
not, were anything but satisfied that the United States
could ratify the treaty without Jeopardizing Its sovereignty
or security.

As It turned out, several of the very amend

ments which Wilson had laboriously managed to add to the
Covenant were those about which the most heated alterca
tions raged.
Sllhu Root expressed several of those doubts upon
which the Republicans would base their objections.

In the

clause concerning withdrawal, there was nothing, apparently,
which prevented the Council from deciding that a nation's
obligations had not been fulfilled.

The Monroe Doctrine

clause was erroneous and ambiguous, and the Council seemed

4°Bartlett, 137.
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to be left with the power of determining **what questions
were solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States.
The Monroe Doctrine clause was ridiculed by Lodge and
Root, among others, because it had been defined as an inter
national engagement.

In their eyes the Monroe Doctrine was

not an international engagement or a regional understanding.
It was solely an American unilateral policy.

It was the

policy of the United States, and not the policy of any
region.42
The most controversial of all the articles in the
Covenant, however, was Article 10,

This provision stipulated

that the members of the League would undertake to guard "as
against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League.
In case of such agression or in case of any threat or danger
of such agression the Council shall advise upon the means by
which this obligation shall be fulfilled."
Root, for example, opposed this article because it
would perpetuate the "distribution of power and territory
made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the

^^Philip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, 1938),
II, 399-400.
42

Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 161,

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

20

Allies In this present juncture of affairs."^®

He considered

It to be an "Indefinite alliance for the preservation of the
status quo. • •"

44
Moreover, in the formulation of this article,

nothing had been done to "limit the vast and incalculable
obligation which Article 10 of the Covenant undertakes to
Impose upon each member of the League. .
In the Senate, however. Article 10 was less rationally
attacked on other counts.

Aside from the "vast and incal

culable obligation" which Article 10 imposed, it was also
46
considered to be a breeder of wars.
It was held by the
more implacable opponents such as Borah that Great Britain would
use it to hold down every part of her empire.*?

And playing

on the sentiments of the Irish-Americans, who had been
slighted by Wilson’s failure at Paris to press for Irish
independence. Article 10 was flaunted by such senators as
an instrument by which American blood would be used to aid
Britain in the perpetual subjection of Ireland,

40

In fact,

one Anglophobe pointed out that even in case of a Canadian

*^As quoted by Jessup,

292.

**As quoted by Jessup,

400,

*®As quoted by Jessup,

399.

*^Fleming, 370.
* ^Ibid.. 122.
^ Bailey. A Diplomatic History of the American People.
(New York, 1940), 667-8. Two Republicans informed the British
Ambassador in Washington that "in using theIrish question
to defeat Wilson and the League they would flay England withour mercy; but they wanted it understood in official British
circles that they meant nothing by it." Ibid.. 668.
(here
after referred to as Diplomatic History),
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revolt egalnst Britain, Article 10 would forbid the United
States from going to the aid of Canada.

49

Then there was Article 11, by which any war or threat
of war was to be a matter of concern for all the other mem
bers of the League, and by which any circumstance which
effected International peace could be brought to the atten
tion of the Council or the Assembly.

This article was also

considered to be a breeder of wars, one which would involve
50
the United States In endless conflicts.
It was also
claimed that by Article 11, other nations could poke their
noses into American affairs.

51

It was also argued that joining the League of Nations
was unconstitutional, in that Congress, as a then subservient
52
body, would be deprived of Its constitutional prerogatives.
A favorite argument of Borah, for example, was that the
United States could refuse, if it wished, to obey the commit
ments under Article 10, but the moral pressure would be so
strong as practically to deprive Congress of its legal right
to do so.

53

Another part of the treaty which displeased many sena
tors was the fact that the British Empire {Great Britain,

^«neming, 123.
5°Ibld.. 249.
^^Balley, The Great Betrayal. 118,
52flemlng, 143-4, 276.
SSlbld., 274.
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1

India and the dominions) was given six votes in the Assembly
of the League ae compared to the one granted the United
States.

Even though the Empire received only one vote in

the Council and unanimity was almost always required in both
bodies, this situation was considered unfair and dangerous
to the United States.
And being, or pretending to be, altruistic, a number
of senators resented the treatment of China with respect to
Shantung.

This province had been taken from Germany by

Japan in 1914, and by a secret treaty with the Allies in
1917, Japan was permitted by the peace conference to retain
55
certain economic rights in Shantung.
Many claimed that
if they assented to the League of Nations Covenant, which
was inextricably bound to the Treaty of peace, they would
find themselves consenting to a rank injustice.
With a number of these precepts in mind, the Foreign
Relations Committee began its long discussion of the treaty
57
on July 14, 1919.
Senator Lodge was chairman of this
committee, and **as the existing conditions demanded," he
made certain that there was a strong Republican opposition
58
in the majority.
There were seventeen members, ten Hepub-

S^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 164-5,
^^Bailey, The Lost Peace. 143.
66
Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 161-4.
S^Lodge, 161.
^ I b i d .. 151-2.
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llcans, Including Borah and MoCumber,

59

and seven Democrats.

The committee held the treaty for forty-five days and de60
livered its report on September 10;
during this time
Wilson, in the face of strong opposition in the senate, was
on his famous and futile tour of the west on behalf of the
treaty.
The report consisted of three parts, one majority report and two minority reports.

62

The majority report, a strongly-worded document,
recommended forty five textual amendments to the treaty and
four reservations.

Among the provisions carried by the

amendments were the guarantee of a vote for the United States
equal to that of the British Empire in the Assembly; end com
plete Chinese control over Shantung.

The reservations in

cluded the unconditional right of the United States to
withdraw from the League; a stipulation that the United
States would not be bound by the obligations under Article
10; and a guarantee that the United States would be the sole
Judge of what constituted domestic questions and the meaning
of the Monroe Doctrine.

^% c C u m b e r was the sole Republican friend of the
League on the Committee.
®^o d g e , 164.
®^Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 90-91, 103.
G^Senate Report No. 176, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
Senate Reports. I, September 10, 1919.
GSlbld.. Part 1.
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The first minority report (Democratic), after a few
counterblows at the majority, demanded unconditional ratifi
ai
cation of the treaty.
The second minority report was delivered by Senator
McCumber,

The first part of his report eloquently praised

the framers of the Covenant and the high purpose for which
It was formulated, and Included a lengthy condemnation of
the bitterly partisan spirit which had marked the methods
and deliberations of the majority.

He then critically ex

amined the provisions In the majority report and recommended
six milder reservations of his own.

These concerned with

drawal, Article 10, domestic questions, the Monroe Doctrine,
and a restriction upon the voting power of the British Em
pire In case of a dispute between a nation and the Mother
65
Country or between a nation and one of her dominions.
Senator Lodge, as leader of the strong reservatlonlsts,
was correct when he stated that by the autumn of 1919, be
cause of the long sustained debates, public opinion had come
to favor ratification with reservations.

This was especially

true, he said, after the average man "came to realize the
questions to be decided and especially the leading Issues
Involved In Article X, the equality of voting, the Monroe

G^Ibld.. Part 2.
Ibid.. Part 3. MoCumber*s stand on reservations,
as In the case of McNary, was that he believed them necessary,
In view of the opposition, to muster enough votes for ratifi
cation.
Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 5861.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

/
25
Doctrine and Shantung."

66

In the Northwest the changing public attitude wna in
dicated in several instances.

The first resolution for

ratification by the North Dakota legislature (March 1919)
was passed even before the first draft of the Covenant had
been revised.

In a second resolution of December, 1919,

however, this legislature asked for ratification "with only
such reservations as are compatible with a binding end bona
fide participation of the United States of America in the
covenant of the League of Nations."

67

In the poll taken of

its members by the National Economic League in September,
it was understood by the voters that reservations would not
be opposed.

63

And in the aforementioned petition signed,

in August, by representative citizens of thirty-nine states,
participation in the League of Nations "with reservations
not inconsistent with its terms" was acceptable.

69

These

general sentiments were also indicated when one observer
declared that the people of the Pacific Northwest favored
the League of Nations, but they none the less desired

G*Lodge, 179.
67

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
H I , 1208.
63
Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 4827-8.
69 Ibid.. 5363-5.
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70
reservation# "In the interest of pure Amerioanism."
The forty five textual amendments of the Foreign Re
lations Committee were rejected by the Senate because a
number of the Republicans (and the Democrats, of course)
realized that such changes would be too long in adoption by
the other powers.^^he committee thereupon continued its
discussions, and on November 6, 1919, Lodge again reported,
this time with fourteen reservations, including those four
of the original report, and in a language which would not
72
alienate the mild reservatlonlsts.
In the votes taken on
the reservations, each one was supported by an almost solid
Republican vote and opposed by an almost equally solid
Democratic vote.

73

The preamble to these reservations stipulated that
American ratification would become binding only after three
of the four principle Allied powers had accepted them in
writing.

The first reservation, concerning withdrawal,

stated that the United States would be the sole judge of
whether it had fulfilled its obligations, end provided
further, as a limitation upon the executive in foreign
affairs, that notice of withdrawal might be given by a

70

F. M. Davenport, "What the Pacific Northwest Thinks
about the League and the Treaty," Outlook. OZZTI (Aufoist 6.
1919), 539.
fllodge, 178.
^^Fleming, 392-3.
73
W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate
(Baltimore, 1933), 295.
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concurrent resolution of Congress.

A concurrent resolution,

of course, does not require the president’s signature, nor
can it be nullified by his veto.

The second reservation

dealt with the ever-controversial Article 10,

This reser

vation stipulated that no obligation would be assumed by
the United States in preserving the territorial integrity
or political Independence of any nation, nor would the
United States employ its military or naval forces for such
a purpose without consent of Congress,

The fourth reserved

to the United States the right to Judge what were domestic
questions; the fifth made the United States the sole inter
preter of the Monroe Doctrine; end the sixth declared that
the United states withheld its assent to the Shantung
settlement.

Reservations seven to thirteen were of minor

importance in that they had little effect upon the opera
tion of the League Itself, although the tenth practically
reserved to the United states full liberty of action in
regard to the limitation of armaments.

The fourteenth and

last reservation dealt with the voting power of Great
Britain in the Assembly,

It stated that the United States

would not be bound by any decision of the League when a
member, along with its parts of empire, had cast more than
^ 74
one vote.
The Republicans who rejected the textual amendments

74

For a full text of the Lodge reservations, see
Bailey, The Great Betrayal, 387-92,
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were the mild reservatlonlsts.^®

The difference between the

mild reservatlonlsts and their stronger brethren, politically,
was that the latter hoped for actual amendments to the treaty
and that they demanded that these changes be formally eo76
cepted by the other powers.
The mild reservatlonlsts,
however, were those who believed that reservations of a
more Innocuous sort might be necessary, and they therefore
attempted, at first, to coalesce with the Democrats, Inas
much as Wilson bad declared his willingness to accept reser
vations of an interpretive character which did not require
the assent of the other powers.

77
McNary, MeCumber end others

of this small group favored reservations of an Interpretive
nature or such Issues as withdrawal. Article 10, domestic
questions and the Monroe Doctrine.

Their purpose was to

"hold a balance of power that would compel one or both of
these groups f_ Democrats end strong reservatlonlsts^ to
modify its position."^® By such a coalition they could have
defeated the Lodge reservations, to leave the remaining
Republicans with the painful choice of either accepting
79
these mild reservations or defeating the treaty outright.

?®Ibld.. 154.
fGjbld.. 56-57.
??Ibld.. 170.
^^Flemlng, 297.
?9#alley, the Great Betrayal. 53.
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But by mld-jâugust of 1919, Wilson suddenly reversed
his attitude end declared that even Interpretive reservations
eould not be accepted.

Thus the mild reservatlonlsts, Im

pelled by party or other considerations, were driven into
the arms of Lodge, and all the stronger reservations which
his group presented became, by the votes of all the Repub80
llcans, binding upon the treaty.
The mild reservatlonlsts defeated the textual amend
ments In November, but reservatlonlsts of all shades became,
for all intents and purposes, of one camp.

In spite of the

marked friendship of the milder group for the treaty.
Senator MoCumber was the only Republican ever to vote for
It without reservations,
—!
The treaty was voted upon for the first time on
November 19, 1919.

The first resolution was for ratifica

tion with the reservations attached.
vote of 55 nays to 39 yeas.

It was defeated by a

Five Ndrthwest senators, all

Republicans end reservatlonlsts, voted yea.

These were

Jones of Washington, Me Cumber of North Dakota, sterling of
South Dakota, McNary of Oregon and Warren of Wyoming.

Those

who rejected It because of the reservations were the Demo
crats Walsh and Myers of Montana, Nugent of Idaho end
Johnson of South Dakota.

The remaining Republicans, the

Irreconcllables Borah of Idaho, Poindexter of Washington

®°Ibld.. 171,
® ^ n e m l n g , 396.
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oo
and Gronna of North Dakota, all voted nay.

Following this

action a reconsideration was proposed and passed.
even a majority failed to respond.

Again

All the northwest sena

tors voted as before except Myers, who voted yea, hoping
perhaps that enough others might follow suit to ratify the
03
treaty.
Finally a vote was taken on the treaty without
reservations.

When it was defeated this time the irrecon-

cilables voted nay, as always, along with all the Republicans
except McCumber, who joined with the Democrats in supporting
It/'
Because of public indignation over this apparently
unnecessary defeat, compromise negotiations were entered
into in January, 1920.

A bipartisan conference composed of

Lodge and other Republicans, plus some Democrats, including
Walsh, attempted to reach an agreement on several issues,
especially on the reservation to Article 10.

85

Wilson held

this article to be the "heart of the Covenant" and the
"essence of Americanism," and therefore was opposed to any
reservation which would weaken it.

86

The enemies of Article

1 0 , of course, pictured it as a breeder of wars and a vexa
tious obligation.

This conference, however, reached no real

Q ^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 session, LVIII,
8786.

I

Q^Ibid.. 8802.
®^Ibld., 6803.
^ % 8 i l e y . The Great Betrayal. 299ff.
®^Fleming, 436-7.
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conclusion.

About the time some kind of agreement seemed to

be in the offing, Senator Lodge was awakened from his com
promising slumbers by an almost violent intimidation by
Borah and a few other irreconcllables, and thenceforth the
efforts of the conference waned.

87

One of the few agree

ments reached was that the other powers, in accepting
American entrance in the League with reservations could
do so by silence or acquiescence instead of by formal
notice.®®
The treaty was considered for the last time on March
19, 1920,

The reservations were altered somewhat and again

they received their heaviest support by Republican votes.

89

At this time also, a fifteenth reservation was added which
would grant self-determination for Ireland.

This reserva

tion, however, was a Democratic strategem; the purpose
was, if possible, to render the body of reservations too
offensive even for the Republicans to stomach.

90

On March 19 the treaty with reservations was defeated
by a vote of 49 for and 35 against (a majority in this case
favored it).

Wilson had notified his Democratic colleagues

in the senate that rejection of the treaty with reservations

®?Bailey, The Great Betrayal.
Jessup, 408.
Stull Holt, 295.
®^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 263-4.
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iras the proper thing.

91

Were it not for this, enough Demo

crats might have swung over (there need only have been seven)
and ratified the t r e a t y . S e n a t o r Walsh, just before the
votes were cast, made an impressive speech, urging that he,
88 a Democrat, intended to vote for the reservations, simply
because the treaty would pass that way or never.

93

Walsh, Nugent and layers all decided, as did many
other Democrats, to ignore the President’s plea end vote
with the Republicans.

Johnson of South Dakota, however,

was one of the three Democratic senators north of the Mason
and Diion line to stand loyally and futilely by Wilson on
94
this vote.
After this date, the treaty was not again con
sidered by the Senate.
In 1920 the country had returned to its internal
economic preoccupations. The people were apathetic
toward international questions and exasperated at the
long-drawn-out bickerings which had brought the settle
ment of peace to an Inconclusive deadlock.
"Normalcy"
and the emergence from post-war economic crises were
uppermost in the national mind.
In accordance with
such impressions and circumstances the two parties
made up their electoral platforms.’^
The Democratic party promised ratification of the
treaty (though not without reservations) and the Republicans

®^Balley, Diplomatic History. 677.
^^Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 267.
^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LII, 4581.
94
Ibid.. 4599.
®%owland, 294-6.
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Inserted a plank, visible enough to please those who favored
the League and ambiguous enough to hold duch as Borah and
others in the ranks.

But the League of Nations no longer

occupied a primary place in the national political con96
sciousness.
In the landslide of 1920, this was clearly
indicated.

The Republican victory was a crushing defeat

for everything for which the Wilson government bad stood.
In the entire Northwest, which shared the sentiments of
the greater part of the nation, only a single county
(Mineral, Montana) polled a Democratic majority.

97

S^Ibid.. 294-6.
9?Edger Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote.
1896-1932 (Stanford University Press, 1934), 20.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

CHAPTEH I I
IRKECOKCILABLiîS
The "Mlrebeau of the Battalion of Death," as Borah was
called by some of his associates,^ believed that American re
jection of the League of Rations was the greatest decision in
foreign affairs since the "promulgation of the îâonroe Doc
trine," and among all those figures who fought for this
rejection Borah, "more then any other man stirred up anti2
League sentiment among the people."
He was the original irreoonsllable.
When other
leaders were discussing the desirability of separating
the Covenant of the League from the Treaty, or urging
the necessity of "Americanizing" it, Borah was saying
he would have none of it. • • B)rah brought the
lawyer's skill in exposing the flaws end jokers in
a document, the orator's superb, exalted eloquence,
and the patriot's sincere convictions to the side of
the opposition. Impelled by little or no consideration
for partisan advantage, he brought dignity end, at
times, magnificence to an opposition which had little
of the former and none of the latter.*
Like Gronna and Poindexter be was a nationalist and an iso
lationist, but he defended his convictions with a sincerity
so deep and so personal, that he remained, among all the others,
the sole opponent of the League who retained Wilson's respect
to the end.

This in itself exempts him from any charge of

a partisan spirit, if not from error.
^Johnson, 223ff.
^Ibid.. 223.
Sibid.. 223.
4lbld.. 223-4, 255.
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Borah, believed, for what to him were sound reesons,
that participation in the League of Nations was the worst
possible step which the United States ever could take; end
long before the League of Nations became any kind of
political issue in the United states, Borah sensed that
this country was entering upon a path of departure from
what he thought was the only possible course in keeping
with the safety and welfare of its best traditions and
Institutions.

Therefore, in April, 1917, when war was

declared upon Germany, Borah gave no unconditional support
to that declaration.

He wished it to be clearly understood

that the war which we were about to enter was, above all,
caused by the German violation of American neutral rights.
He maintained that the European war was no concern of ours,
end that the United States had done everything within the
limits of honor and self respect to remain neutral.

He

believed that ours was an American war to protect American
rights, honor and security, and that beyond that the United
5
States could not commit itself.
In a few terse phrases,
he stated the position by which he was to stand through
thick and thin for a good many months to come:
I join no crusade; I seek or accept no alliances; I
obligate this country to no other power. I make war
alone for my countrymen and their rights, for my country
and its honor.^

^Congressional Record. 65 Congress , 1 Session,
LV, 252-3.
^Ibid.. 253.
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A lso, In January end April of 1917, and In December,
1918, when the war had Just ended, Borah offered spirited
resolutions that the United States reaffirm its faith and
confidence in the Monroe Doctrine and in the policies laid
down by Washington and Jefferson.

7

In his speeches against the League of Nations, Borah
had access to whet could be called a schoolboy’s knowledge
of history, which seemed to be entwined among all his basic
convictions.

By this knowledge he could prove anything, at

least to his own satisfaction.

His greatest asset, however,

which made him a formidable opponent on the floor, was his
oratorical skill; for as seen, perhaps, by others,
. . .it would be difficult to ejgpe with a man who felt
as strongly about it /the League/ as that, and who could
express his hatred of the idea so effectively. . . .
Probably few Senators cared to undertake it spontan
eously.®
He had a peculiar distrust for any kind of inter
nationalism, and a phobia for anything foreign, especially
European:
It is his belief in American democracy, American freedom.
This democracy is peculiar to ourselves and we must work
it out alone.
Croing into an international combination
might level it down, contaminate it, besmirch it. His
nationalism is built upon his belief in the sufficiency
of American democracy.

^Congressional Record. 64 Congress, 2 Session, LIV,
1950; Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 1 Session, LV, 440;
Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 3 Session, LVII, 124.
^Fleming, 95.
^Johnson, 255.
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Borah also had a very strong reverence for the great
men of his country.

Throughout his speeches in the Senate,

his references to the policies and characters of the Founding
Fathers recur with monotonous frequency.

The United States

seemed to him to be the culmination of a centuries-old and
arduous strife for freedom, and to him the immutable prin
ciples as laid down in the Declaration of Independence and
the Bill of nights found their highest expression in the
hallowed utterances of Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln.
According to Borah, the war from which the United
States had just emerged was one between two forms of
government.

One of these was the embodiment of the lîagna

Charts, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution of the United States and the "principles of
human liberty which they embody and preserve."

The other

was an autocratic, war-hungry state, a "remorseless and
soulless" institution which never yielded to the hopes end
aspirations of the masses.

The war was another phase of

the old struggle of liberty against power which man had
so valiantly carried on from Llarathon to Verdun.

History,

to Borah, was marked by many such struggles for the
principles of liberty and justice— Charles Kartell at
Tours, the Allies at Waterloo, Washington at Valley Forge,
and Lincoln at Chancellorsv i l l e . The World War was

^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 2 session,
LVI, 3655-6.
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fought for these prinelples~it was a contest between the
principles of the Hohenzollerns and the faith of Abraham
Lincoln.

He believed that

the most priceless heritage which this war will leave to
a war-torn and weary world is the demonstrated fact that
a free people of a free government can make war success
fully and triumphantly, can defy and defeat militarism
and preserve throughout all their independence, their
freedom and the integrity of their institutions.H
Such was Borah's nationalism, and between him and those
who advocated American membership in the League of Nations or
any other form of international tribunal, there existed a
gulf which nothing could span.
Throughout his more characteristic speeches, Borah
appealed as much to the ideological principles involved as
he did to the legal flaws in the Covenant— to the shameful
sacrifices which the United States would necessarily make
by participation in the League.

The Monroe Doctrine, he

said, had been "thrown up as a dyke against the threatened
flood of foul inundation" of our own league of nations—
that of the free nations of the Western Hemisphere.

"It

was the new Republic's bold challenge to this unconscionable
conspiracy /the Holy Alliance/ bent upon the destruction of
frjÊB governments," and it was the Monroe Doctrine that the
League of Nations would d e s t r o y . I t

was also Borah's

lllbid.. 3655-6.

12c
^^Congressional

Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,

LVII, 1957
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contention that the recent and glorious victory over a
"trained, brutal militarism" was attained by the love of
the frenchman for his country, the love of the Briton for
his country, end the American’s love for his, and it was
this love of country, this patriotism which was so necessary, that internationalism would kill.

13

But when it came to the fate of his own country,
Borah’s attitude was yet less detached;
. .God pity the ideals of this Republic if they
shall have no defenders save the gathered scum of the
nations organized into a conglomerate international
police force, ordered hither and thither by the most
heterogeneous and irresponsible body or court that
ever confused or confounded the natural instincts and
noble passions of a p e o p l e .
Borah thus often compared the high principles and in
stitutions of the American system with the pernicious and
evil ways of the Old world.

Nor did he hesitate, in spite

of admitted virtues in many cases, to magnify the "untrust
worthy” practices of the other nations.

The League of

Nations, for example, he considered to be a triumph for
British diplomacy, since Britain had surrendered utterly
nothing at the peace conference.

The British umpire,

specifically, had managed to attain six votes in the
Assembly compared to the one granted the United atates,
and the fact that there was to be no abrogation of the
secret treaties which had been concluded during the war

ISlbid.. 1387.
^^Ibid.. 1387.
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between Britain, France and Italy, meant that the other na
tions had also Joined in a conspiracy against us.^®
But the United States, lamented Borah, had surrendered
almost its all— it had surrendered the traditional foreign
policy of one hundred years end had placed its man power,
its finances and its sovereignty at the disposal of foreign
powers for the purpose of guarding the Integrity of their
possessions the world over.^^
True to his equalitarianism, Borah pointed to Ireland,
and claimed that, even though she would perhaps not receive
her independence soon, she would never receive it under the
League of Nations, as such a thing would be prevented by
Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the Covenent,^^

y/hen the Irish

reservation was voted upon in March, 1920, Borah supported
it because to him it signified the Senate’s recognition of
the noble principle of self-determination.

But even if

Ireland did receive her freedom, he maintained, and were
admitted to the League, she would be worse off under that
combination than she had been for the past seven-hundred
18
years.

^ ^Ibid.. 3914-15.
^^Ibid.. 3914-15.
Congressione1 Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 2078. Article 16 provided for various types of
police action, military and economic, to be used against
covenant?breaking states.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIÏ, 4507.
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Likewise did he attack the injustice of the Shantung
settlement and the expectation that the United States would
assent to such a wrong by ratification of the treaty.
And bringing the matter home, he displayed his westerner's
distrust of big business by pointing out that the ”inordlnate"
desire for ratification without debate or consideration was
20
merely the concerted effort of wall Street.
Finally, said Borah, if the United States intended to
ratify the treaty, there was only one just and proper way to
do it— by taking the matter directly to the people, to the
man in the street, the field, in the common walks of life.
The policy of George Washington, which the United states
had followed for so many decades, was superior '♦even to the
will of the people of the United States represented in
Congress acting under the Constitution,” and until that
policy was repudiated by the people themselves, by the

_

sovereign will of the people of the United States, Congress
had no moral right to do otherwise than observe it.

21

Inspired by these strong feelings, Borah used his
lawyer's skill to tear the treaty limb from limb, and bring
to the surface what were to him pernicious provisions.

^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress. 1 Session,
LVIII, 4439.
^^Ibld.. 2062. Thomas W. Lamont of the House of
Morgan had shown a premature publication of the treaty to
Senator Lodge. Bailey, The Great Betrayal. 4; Jessup, 397-8,
21

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, LIX,
2694-5. This quotation ip from Senator Lenroot (Rep., 111.)
who questioned Borah on this subject.
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Obligations and subtle dangers contained in that document*
Article 8, which dealt with disarmament, he claimed to be
very hazy and providing for no positive plan, which was just
the way the Europeans had designed it*

22

Furthermore, he

d«nanded, how could disarmament ever be effective with
"article 10 and article 11 staring us in the face day by
dayi"^^

And was the United States to guard the territorial

integrity of nations by taking the advice of "five or nine
men sitting at Geneva as to how we shall perform our obli
gations under article 10?"

Under this article every local

war would Immediately flare into a "world conflict.
And even though the Council*s decisions were solely of an
advisory nature, the United States would be under the
"highest moral obligation to accept the advice of the
council," and to repudiate it would be dishonorable*

25

Again speaking of disarmament, Borah stated such
would be impossible under the "war-artid e s ,"— 10, 11,
26
and 16*
And Article 11, he claimed, was stronger and
even "more latitudinous than the terms of the Holy Alliance,"

^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 1738.
23 Ibid*. 1741.
^^Ibid*. 1743*
25ibid*. 1747.
^^Ibid*. 1748*
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because it gave the League power to suppress an Insurreo27
tlon.
Moreover, Articles 10 end 11 together gave the
League jurisdiction over "every conceivable disturbance
which may be interpreted as war or threat of war, end it
is immaterial whether it is internal or external."

2S

Concerning the voting power of the British Empire in
the Assembly, Borah pointed to the dual role of the dominions.
They were morally bound and obligated, he said, to the Mother
Country, and there was at the same time no provision which
prevented them all from sometime becoming members of the
Council.

29

But even considering the fact that Britain was

limited in her powers in the League by only holding one vote
In the Council, the United States, he said, had yet lost.
The United States yielded on the freedom of the aeas, on
the secret treaties, on the protectorate of Egypt and on
Irish independence.

Then it had to take a subordinate

position on the Assembly and yield its "equality of pres
tige, equality of moral and intellectual power, equality
of dignity and honor."®®
Borah's opposition to the League was relentless and
uncompromising.

For him nothing was commendable about the

League nor could anything bad enough be said of it.

^"^Ibid.. 2080.
^Qlbid.. 5935.
^ ® I M d . , 7496.
®®Ibid., 7325.
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hatred end fear of such an Instrument had a strength that
nothing could break.

When the treaty was defeated in

November, 1919, Borah announced that the killing of it was
the greatest thing the Senate had ever done, end for this
noble action, the Senate was "entitled to the gratitude of
the .American people for all time to come," even if it
should do nothing else.^l
Senator Poindexter was very prominent in the Repub
lican party in 1919, but he differed from Borah in several
respects.

He was noticeably less sincere in his opposition

to the League, and at times he betrayed a rather partisan
attitude.

In 1918, for example, he bitterly assailed Wilson

for his request for a Democratic Congress on the ground that
Wilson wanted a rubber stamp for his policies (which charge,
however, did not lack validity), end on the ground that
Wilson was desirous of an easy defeat for the "good German
Empire.And

as a prospective candidate for the presi

dency in 1920, he also revealed a rather reactionary spirit.
The League of Nations at that time had not yet seen its
final defeat.

Poindexter went to some length to list the

"errors" of the Democratic Administration, and prescribed
such Republican measures for a "wise economy" as reduced

31

Congressional Record. 66 Congress. 2 Session.

LIX, 403.
^^Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 2 session,
LVI, 11501-2.
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taxes upon industry and consumption, and a supplement in the
form of a higher tariff wall.

He also found reason to pro

pose the employment of the United States Navy for the en
forcement of all "radio communication between the United
States and the rest of the world."

He declared that peace

should be immediately concluded and that the treaty of peace
should be "stripped of all extraneous incumbrances.

. ."

meaning, of course, the Covenant of the League of Nations.
Rirthermore, he urged, the United states should cease
meddling in the affairs of the other nations and the Monroe
Doctrine should be firmly reestablished,

33

Poindexter was the first senator to speak on the
Covenant after the first draft had been published in American
newspapers.
remarks.

Before that time, however, he did venture a few

In December, 1918, he argued that, since the United

States and Great Britain had settled boundary disputes with
out war, what was the purpose of a league of nations when
such disputes could be settled so easily?^^
Six weeks later, he maintained that the Europeans did
not really want the United States to belong to a league of
nations.

He claimed that those countries resented our inter

ference in their affairs just as we would resent their

^^William de Wagstaffe, "What Poindexter Stands For,"
Forum. LZIII (February, 1920), 197-204,
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,
LVII, 181.
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meddling in the affairs of the Western Eemisphere.

There was

in existence, or could be, he said, the greatest of all lea
gues of nations*

This was the allied and associated powers

which had just defeated Germany in a great "enforcement of
peace*"

The United States should advocate, instead of a

supergovernment, an aesociation of nations based upon good
will and common sense.®®
Poindexter*8 longest attack on the League was made
on February 19, 1919, before the Covenant had been revised
and in open defiance of Wilson’s request that debates be
withheld until he returned from France.

The question to be

decided, said Poindexter, was whether the United States should
adhere to the principles of Washington and Monroe, while
maintaining friendly relations with all nations, or whether
it should ensnare itself in the most entangling alliance
conceivable*

Would we promote peace or war, he wondered,

by requiring that each nation meddle in the affairs of
•ZA

Others?

Reviewing the examplary character of the United

States, he continued:
There is no other citizenship in the world so en
tirely free of class distinction or discrimination as
that of the American people. There is no other nation
which to day is more absolutely sovereign than the
United States. There is no other nation where an
individual citizen, standing upon an absolute legal
and governmental equality with every other citizen,
wields an equal voice in determining the highest
prerogatives of government. . . .
The question now

^ ^Ibid.. 1803.
®®Ibid*. 3747.
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presented Is whether or not the high sovereign Juris
diction of the political heirs of Jefferson, Washington
and Lincoln is to be in part surrendered and subjected
to the control of strangers and aliens.'^”
In reference to several specific provisions, Poindexter
claimed that the League of Nations bound mankind forever.
There was no provision for withdrawal, end each nation would
surrender its sovereign right to regulate the rules, methods
and degree of disarmament.

Furthermore, he claimed, arbitra

tion would be compulsory for questions of every description,
and each nation would be committed to fight wars at any
time and at any place deemed necessary.

And also, as dis

armament would be confined to the member nations, a nonmember with a large military force would, by virtue of the
weaker forces of the members, be strongly tempted toward
38
conquest.
Poindexter further reminded that, if the United states
should Join the League of Nations, the people would do so
with the understanding that they would live up to their word.
Therefore, he maintained, if the Senate should ratify the
treaty, and the United States should feel unwilling in the
future to accept any of the League's decisions, the only
avenue of escape would be dishonor.

Moreover, he argued,

the constitution of the League was an "alien tribunal," and
American participation would mean the 'delegation of powers
of the government of the United States to another power."
5?Ibid.. 3747.
38ibld.. 3748-0.
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Also, if the United States dared Ignore the mandates of this
organization, it would find itself at war with all the other
.
39
members.
Again, Poindexter repeated, a league of nations was
not necessary.

The United States, for example, had preserved

peace in Eaiti, San Domingo and Honduras, and had taken Vera
Cruz and made war upon Villa without one.

Furthermore, If

the civilized nations of the world, organized as they had
been, could not perpetuate the peace, a league to enforce
such a peace would obviously fail.

In fact, said Poindexter,

with all the complexities and obligations which a lea#ie
would create, the occasions for war would only multiply,
A league of nations would be nothing more than a "fertile
seed of war," and the expenses and sacrifices of all kinds
which would accrue under such a thing would be beyond cal
culation.

And worse yet, the damage done to the "spirit

of our government. . ./would be/. • .far more sinister than
the losses which we will inevitably suffer in men and money."
Despotic internationalism should never be permitted to under40
mine the principles of local government and self-determination.
During this sweeping attack on the League of Nations,
Poindexter struck a note of questionable wisdom when pointing,
no doubt, to Wilson the Virginian and the Southern Democrats

5*Ibld.. 3750.
^ I b i d .. 3752-3.
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In the Senate, he said:
It Is a curious clrcxuustance. . .that the South. . •
which failed in Its great effort for Independence In
1865, having obtained control of the Government of the
Union, now is about to achieve the sardonic triumph of
depriving the North of its independence and setting up
over it a supergovernment. The North conquered the
South by force of arms; the South now seems to be in
a fair way of conquering the North by a diplomatic
surrender of its liberties. The South, having fought
the most heroic war, in many respects, in history, and
having lost and been subjected to the domination of the
North, now apparently has no objection to go still fur
ther and subject both the South and the North to the
control of an international government
After the Covenant had been revised, Poindexter's
attitude remained very much the same.

In Article 15 of the

Covenant there is a section by which disputes may be referred
to the Assembly.

Forgetting the facility with which boundary

disputes had been settled between the United states end Great
Britain, he reminded the Senate that, by this article, it
would be a simple process for a foreign country. Greet
Britain, for example, to lay claim to four counties in the
State of Maine.

And if the friends of Great Britain on the

Assembly should decide that she had a valid claim to these
four counties, the decision of that body would stand as the
42
final adjudication of the question.
Poindexter could not understand the president's re
mark that Article 10 was the "heart of the Covenant."

If

4 1lbid.. 3754.
^^Conffressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII,
8588. The same thing could be said of the "friends of Great
Britain" on the Council, but in this section of Article 15
the principle of unanimity does not necessarily hold. See
for example Lodge, 393-4.
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the Covenant were adopted, he claimed, we could expect no more
success in preserving the territorial integrity of e nation
than was attained by the Belgian neutrality pact of 1831,
whose language was stronger even than that of Article 10
in the present agreement.

And, continued Poindexter, the

President himself was rather inconsistent.

In 1914, the

United States could have "assumed the obligations embodied
in the present article 10, .

but Wilson at that time

deemed the European crisis to be no concern of ours.
however, the President had changed his mind.

Now,

He expected

that the United States should obligate itself in advance
"under all circumstances without the opportunity to determine whether the emergency justifies it or not. . ."

43

Senator Poindexter may be remembered for e bit of
ringing Americanism of his own:

If the United States should

join the League of Nations, it would surrender all it had
fought for.

This country, of course, never fought unless

it had to, but it should certainly not surrender the right.
Like the proverbial Irishman who had to fight for his black
eyes, the United states should likewise reserve the right
to fight for what was its own.

It should not join a league

of nations and depend upon the kindness of Canada, Haiti
and Panama to take care of it.

44

^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session, LIX,
4122-3.
* *Ibld.. 4124.
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Senator Gronna had been an Isolationist and a pacifist
during the war, and it was these baaio sympathies which most
likely caused him to oppose the League of Nations.

He be

lieved that, had the United States taken a firm stand against
the murder of American citizens, as in the case of the
Lusitania, war between the United states and the Central
Powers could have been averted,

45

Furthermore, he believed

that the Wilson Administration, which appealed for support
in 1916 to keep the United States out of the conflict, had
changed over night and become, instead of "angels of peace,"
46
advocates of war.
And because he believed that the American
people had not been sufficiently informed as to the exigencies
and policies which led them into the war, he chose, in 1917,
to vote against that declaration.

47

It was also significant,

he said, that those very senators who were at the present
time clamoring for a peace through the ratification of the
Covenant had been, in 1917, clamoring for war.

Actually, he

said, those senators knew as well as he did that the Covenant
could never perpetuate the peace, simply because it was not
AQ

based upon the principles of equality and justice.

45

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 7420.
^^Ibid.. 7420.
47
Ibid.. 7420.
48ibid.. 7420.
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Aside from the "Shantung robbery," Gronna had no ob
jections to the treaty of peace.

W t he opposed the League

Covenant wholeheartedly, and undertook to analyse this in
strument article by article:
In spite of a provision in Article 1 for withdrawal,
such a thing might well be impossible, because forelgnifflposed obligations might be of a sort to render their
fulfillment impossible.

The language in Article 3, which

stated that the Assembly could deal with any matter "within
the sphere of the League," was so vague that domestic ques
tions might easily come within the sphere of the League's
operations.

Such things as immigration, religion and morals

might be open to foreign jurisdiction.

By Article 4, Great

Britain, with her votes in the Assembly could increase her
membership at will.

Referring to Article 6, Gronna pointed

out that unanimous concurrence would not always protect the
United states from the designs of foreign nations because,
as provided in Article 15, a dispute involving this country
would exclude it from voting in the Council.

Moreover, in

Article 6, the Council was given the power to decide upon
the limitation of armaments among the various nations, and
therefore this "supergovernment" would have the authority
to demand reports on industries, foods and munitions.

By

Article 10, the United States would be both morally and
legally bound to go to war whemever and wherever the Council
should so decide.

And by Article 11, which would similarly

place this country at the mercy of the Council for fighting
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wars all over the world, the League would also have the power
to interfere in all the affairs of every nation.

In Article

15, it was left up to the Council to decide the nature of
domestic questions, end finally, the Monroe Doctrine clause
in Article 21 waa an impertinence.

The Monroe Doctrine was

an American policy, end not an international agreement, and
as such should not have been given to the interpretation of
European governments.

49

Gronna announced that the provisions of the Covenant
had been laid down in accordance with Wilson's Fourteen
Points, he would have approved of it.

Had the principle

of "open covenants of peace openly arrived at" been adhered
to at the peace conference, the "Shantung robbery" would
never have been condoned, and the United'States would not
have had to approve the "wrong dona in 1893 and approve the
secret treaty made by Japan during the recent war when she
threatened to overpower the Chinese people unless these con50
cessions were made."
Unless the Americans could agree, therefore, that
all the President's war-time addresses, including the Four
teen Points, should "ipso facto become a portion of the
covenant of the treaty," it would have to be conceded, said
Gronna, that the principles of the President, at one time

49ibid.. 7421-6.
SOlbld.. 7426.
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so humans, had been abandoned.

When the President, in his

Fourteen Points, demanded that Russia be allowed to determine
her own political and national policies, he should also have
included Ireland, Finlbnd, India, or any other oppressed
nation.

We could not tell any liberty-loving people that

we were "carrying out our pledge in good faith," when, in
fact we proposed to set up over them a super-state, governed
by a very few.

51

Senator Gronna announced, proudly, that he was "born
on American soil," but that his parents were from Norway,
and that he was not ashamed of being descended from that
splendid people.

They loved liberty and they compared favor

ably with the people of any other nation of the world.

He

was aware, of course, that the other senators present were
not interested in Scandinavian history, but he none the less
embarked upon a lengthy description of that area, beginning
with earliest times.

He pointed out, by a number of in

volved examples, that even people who are of the same racial
stock and religious belief cannot without great difficulty
come to terms on all matters "without dissension and troubles
which may lead to war."

He made a happy exception, of course,

when he added that this situation did not apply to America,
for any person who came to this land relinquished all that
was inimical to American citizenship.

And if that person

Sllbid.. 7427.
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was not willing to do so, he was "not worthy of the splendid
opportunity of becoming a citizen of this great land— *the
land of the free and the home of the breve.*"

52

Gronna then chose to transcent himself end remind
everyone that
some four thousand years ago, when there was but one
language in the world, and the earth was of one speech,
the generations of Roah undertook to perpetuate this
condition, and in order to do so they attempted on
the plain of Shiner to construct a great building in
the form of a tower. Undoubtedly this was done in the
very best of intentions, as it may be with the best of
intentions that the league is advocated by its pro
ponents who profess that it will promote peace. The
people of that day wanted to build a monument so high
that it might reach into heaven. They wanted to
assume a certain name lest they be scattered abroad
over the face of the whole earth; but we arealso told
that the Lord came down to see the citywhich the
children of men builded, and the Lord said—
Behold the people is one.
He recognized that they were one.®^
Therefore, continued Gronna, the Lord confounded the
languages of the people so that they were confused and could
not understand each other.

Since that day the people have

been scattered all over the face of the earth.

It was deemed

by one Mighty Power that one people and one language was an
unwise thing.

God did not want man's individuality to be

lost, and now, with all the nationalities on earth, a union
of them would be as difficult as the construction of the Tower
of Babel.

52ibid.. 7427-8.
GSlbld.. 7427.
G^ibid.. 7427.
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Gronna conceded that the League of Nations, if com
posed of men of altruistic Ideals, might become a "power for
good,"

But if its members were otherwise, the League would

be just as powerful as an instrument of injustice and oppres
sion, with the probable result of endless wars, "wars which
could not cease until this supergovernment was destroyed."55
Gronna reiterated his final position by saying that
the American soldiers, living and dead, had always uppermost
in their minds the protection of the United States from a
foreign foe and the liberation of oppressed peoples.

They

had no desire to change the boundaries of Europe or elsewhere,
or to guarantee the territorial integrity of "all the nations
of the earth."

Ho could not, therefore, approve of this

treaty.
1
Senators Borah, Poindexter and Gronna had one aim in
common— the absolute defeat of the League of Nations.

With

regard to the Covenant as a legal instrument or international
constitution, their views were likewise similar.

Each was

convinced, or pretended to be, that the League of Nations
was little more than a war contract, especially when it
contained such things as Article 10.

Each had a marked dis

trust for the fidelity or policies of foreign nations, es
pecially Great Britain, and each also was jealously watchful

55ibid.. 7427.
5*Ibid., 7430,
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of anything which he believed would infringe upon American
euperlority, especially in the Western Hemisphere*

Because

of these feelings, each gave his support to all the Lodge
reservations, obviously in an attempt to render the thing as
innocuous as possible in the event that it did pass.

57

But otherwise, there were essential differences among
these men.

Poindexter revealed a rather vindictive spirit,

and it would appear to him that the League was but an enemy
made to order.

Gronna was most likely sincere in his opposi

tion, although lacking in the forcefulness of the other two.
Borah, however, stood alone.

Whatever might be said about

his views on the League question, be none the less defended
his convictions with an honesty that could not be refuted.
To'What extent the declamations of these senators influenced
public opinion is difficult to say, but if it is true that
Borah's influence was the strongest in cooling popular sen
timent, it is not difficult to see why.

^^Borah, for example, once said that there was "little
doubt that sooner or later. . .the treaty will be ratified
with the league of nations in it." Congressional Record,
66 Congress, 1 Session, LVIII, 8781.
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CHAPTER III
STRONG RESERVATIONISTS
The strong reserTstionists from the Northwest followed
Senator Lodge.

These were Thomas Sterling of South Dakota,

Francis E. Warren of Wyoming and Wesley Jones of Washington.
They supported practically all the Lodge reservations and two
of them, Warren and sterling, were among the thirty-nine
senators who signed the Round Robin in the early days of the
controversy.^

They were not opposed to ratification of the

treaty, but they were willing to do so only when they were
sure, among other things, that certain American interests were
adequately safeguarded and that the United states would at
all times retain its sovereignty and independence of action.
These Northwest Senators were men of decided opinions.
Their attitudes toward the League of Nations differed only
slightly from those of such men as Borah, Gronna and Poin
dexter.

Rather than allow themselves to be transported by

the promises of a peace which, to many, the League seemed to
offer, they devoted most of their energies to admonitions
against any action taken by the United states without due

^The only occasion on which a reservation did not re
ceive the vote of any of these senators was when he was ab
sent.
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Geutiozi and oiroumspeotlon.

The measure of partisan motivation is plainly apparent
only in the oese of Jones.

Sterling conceded that the Pres

ident had been constitutionally justified in negotiating
the treaty Independently of and without interference by the
2
Senate, and neither Sterling nor Warren mentioned the Pres
ident in a manner indicative of a personal or political
antagonism.
Jones, however, expended many words in flaying Wilson
on several counts.

In fact It is evident that much of his

opposition was partisan in spirit and, at times, almost per
sonal.

So strong were his attacks on Wilson and on the

Covenant that his votes in favor of the latter might have
come as a surprise to anyone who had been familiar with the
more spirited phases of his denunciations.
In any event, these three senators were apparently
satisfied with the League Covenant after it had been packed
with reservations sufficient in strength and number to satis
fy their respective political sensibilities.

Thomas Sterling,

If not speaking for them all, none the less spoke sincerely
and with an eye for the concrete, when he did choose to de
fend the League of Nations and to protest America’s obliga
tions to that organization.
If it was true, he said that the harsh terms which

^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 3 session, LVII,
1314.
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the peace conference had Imposed upon Germany and Austria
would produce disastrous economic results; and if, by
ratifying the treaty with the Lodge reservations to guard
American institutions, liberties and rights,
might we not. . .by becoming a member of the League of
Sations, have a wholesome influence, a stabilizing and
steadying effect upon the conditions there? Might not
out counsel and our advice in a council of the League
of Nations concerning the economic conditions of the
European countries be worth while and help to mitigate
some of the horrors which have been described?. , .
/We should not/ • . .resist the appeals of the desti
tute and starving.*
The senator from Wyoming believed that because of the
rapid rise of the United states to its high position in world
leadership, such a position could not be called accidental.
There was no doubt whatsoever, he maintained, that this
American success was due almost solely to the American form
of government.

It had been attained by loyal adherence to

the principles of self-government as laid down by the fathers
and embodied in the Constitution.

It was the result, he

said, of undivided allegiance in past times to those pre
cepts embodied in such monumental utterances as Washington's
Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine and the Gettysburg
Address,

It was these fundamental truths and doctrines,

that had so successfully guided us in the past, which should
4
be applied at this time.

^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIZ, 2698-9.
^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 7064.
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Such, essentially, waa the attitude of Francis £•
Warren, the champion of Americanism and apostle of the mean.
I cannot agree with the program outlined in a recent
meeting of the communist party at Chicago to join with
the Bolsheviki in an international plot to overthrow
this Government and to supplant it with their own
Utopian mesmerisms.
Nor can I agree with the attitude
of Mr. Gompers, when he recently said before a senate
committee that if a law were passed to prevent railroad
strikes he believed that the railroad unions would
strike, regardless of law and order. I cannot agree
with the Boston policemen who, in direct violation of
their solemn oath to uphold the law deserted their
posts and relinquished the city to the mercy of hood
lums. I cannot agree with the President, who, in his
recent Dea Moines speech, said that the league of na
tions is bigger than the senate and greater than our
government.5
The United States, Warren continued, should not subject
itself as a vassal to an international organization.
should not discard its heritage.

It

Our government, he main

tained, should remain supreme "with the spirit and patriotism
in which it was conceived and reared."

Therefore the League

of Nations should be Americanized in such a way that these
principles would be recognized.

Reservations should be adop

ted which would preserve all those liberties which the
American people had enjoyed since their independence.

Other

wise, the Liberty Bell, the Civil war, the Emancipation
Proclamation and the blood spilled on the fields of France
all would signify nothing.^

if the United states bad been

the

®Ibld., 7064.
*Ibid.. 7064.
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altruistic Samsonian giant in the past it will surely
be shorn of its copious looks by sacrificing its birth
right to join the present league of nations.?
Senator Warren claimed that because of radical changes,
Greece and Rome as well as many other governments had fallen.
We should not, therefore, listen to those "voices of the air"
which would have us hastily adopt such a radical change as
the League of Nations.

We should keep in mind the teachings

of the past while we weighed the problems which were before
us at this time.®
Warren insisted that the patriotic sentiments of the
men who favored the League could not, of course, be questioned,
but these men had blindly followed its principles and had
allowed themselves to be carried beyond the point of common
sense.

They had allowed themselves to be attracted, by

visions and mirages, to "an extreme and radical position."
Moderation, he believed, should remain the creed:
Be not the first by whom the new are tried.
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside.
Examining the Covenant, Warren listed his several
specific objections.

The right of a people, he said, acting

through Congress, "to approve or disapprove the sending forth
of American soldiers to possible death has never been ques
tioned."

Yet, he continued, by Article 10, the breath of

?Ibid.. 7064.
®lbid.. 7064-5.
*As quoted by Warren, ibid., 7065.
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life was strangled from this principle.

If the nation was

morally bound to do anything, then it followed that it was
also legally bound.
Also, he pointed out, if the United States wished to
withdraw, the League Council would be the deciding tribunal
when the question was raised whether we bad fulfilled our
obligations.

Therefore, to place our power to withdraw in

the hands of others would be a relinquishment of our national
rights.

And by Articles 11 and 12, this country would have

to submit any circumstance which threatened the peace among
nations to the Jurisdiction of the League.

Such a provision,

he claimed, might cover many things, such as immigration
from the Orient, the regulation of taxes and foreign
commerce.

11

Moreover, Warren held that the Monroe Doctrine clause
was vague and uncertain, and that we should not submit this
historic document for interpretation "by the very people
against whom it was directed."

Also, he said, the six votes

granted the British Empire in the Assembly was an injustice,
and the Shantung end Flume policies were likewise bad.

we

should not acquiesce in these matters without some word of
protest.

12

lOlbid.. 7065.
lllbid.. 7065.
l&The port of Flume was given to the newly created
state of Yugoslavia. This incensed many Americans, who be
lieved, or pretended to believe, that Italy had the rightful
claim to this port. Fleming, 100-203.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

64
If the League Covenant In the fora then proposed would
prevent war, and at the same time preserve American sovereignty],
it would certainly have met with his, Warren*s, approval.
his opposition to it, he insisted, was not partisan.

But

The

issue was merely the broad question of Americanism,^^
In early 1919, before the first draft of the Covenant
had been published, and before the debates on the League had
gotten underway, Thomas Sterling expressed strong misgivings
about the creation of a league of nations.
He maintained that the question was not whether we
should have a league of nations, but whether we should have
it at that time.

It was a question whether its creation

would consume the valuable time of the peace conference,
the aim of which should be the immediate settlement of the
issues which had arisen out of the recent war.

As soon as

was possible, he believed, the rights of the Allies and
the obligations of the Central Powers should be deter
mined.
Actually, sterling claimed, the relations and com
mon purposes of the Allied nations constituted an almost
perfect guarantee of a world peace.

Moreover, as the es

tablishment of a league to enforce such a peace would be

13

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 session,
LVIII, 7065.
^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 session,
LVII, 3607.
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fraught with insurmountable difficulties, the conference
should not be burdened or delayed with the consideration of
such a thing.

The conclusion of a peace to mark the end of

the great war was the goal toward which ell the energies
of the commission should be devoted,

15

%hen President Wilson praised the spirit of brother
hood which had existed between Îranee and the United states,
he shed light on a circumstance which, in Sterling’s eyes,
made a league of nations unnecessary.

This was true, he

believed, because no such thing as an armed association of
nations was needed between such closely united nations as
these.

At ell times the thoughts of the peoples of the two

republics harked back to the beginnings which they had in
common— to Washington and Franklin, to Lafayette end
Roohambeau, and to the perils and sacrifices which they
had shared in the riddance of this, the last end greatest
threat to civilization and freedom.

And such ties of friend

ship also existed between.the United states and Great Bri
tain.

Because of mutual regard and suocessùl diplomacy

over the years, no dispute since 1814 had led to war be16
tween them.
sterling’s conviction was that this "trinity of
nations"— the United states. Great Britain and France—
would be united in peace and good understanding, for many

l^ibid.. 1314.
IGibid.. 1314-15.
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JBBTB to come, by the blood of their eons so freely shed.

17

Months later, after the treaty in its final form had
been presented to the senate, the attitude of sterling
slowly and imperceptibly evolved toward the acceptance of
the ideas embodied in the League of Nations.
The President of the United States, he said, had been
the most prominent figure in securing approval by the other
nations of the original draft of the Covenant.

And allegedly

he had been opposed to any change in the first form and to
any debates on the League in the senate until this consti
tution (of the League) had been formally presented to that
body.

But, said Sterling, discussions on this subject

could not be delayed.

In fact, when the first draft was

approved at the conference, it was the understanding that
the work of the League of Nations committee at that junc
ture was not to be adjudged as final.

It was understood

that the Covenant was to be the subject of criticism and
discussion, with a view to changes and amendments in those
particulars wherein criticism was just and reasonable.

X8

Sterling believed that it was in this spirit of
reasonable criticism that discussions went on in the Senate
against the will of the President.

There was a general

sentiment, he said, in favor of some sort of league to

l?Ibid.. 1315.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 3607.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

67
to prevent war and guarantee the peace of the world.

But

the questions of how a league of nations would affect our
sovereignty, and to what degree the United States would
have to depart from Its traditional policies, remained
vague end indefinite.

Hence the discussions which ensued

were of great value in clearing up a number of these ob
scurities.

The American people, he recalled, were reminded

of the deep concern of the founding fathers for the future
welfare of the republic, end of the warnings against en
tangling alliances.

The people were reminded that, from

the very beginning the United States had consistently ad
hered to the principles of the fathers, and that in doing
so the nation, in its material development and in the per
manency of its institutions, had gained the admiration of
the world.

Therefore the people were reluctant, he said,

to endorse the Covenant in its first form.19
But Sterling also wanted it understood after the
Covenant had been revised, the average citizen should not
be deceived by the claim that the prolonged opposition to
the League was partisan or factious.

Indeed, he said, the

citizen was quite familiar with the "old landmarks"--the
policies of Washington, Jefferson and Monroe— and because
of his deep regard for these things, it was not surprising
that the citizen himself strongly desired "safeguards

19lbid.. 3607, The first senator to "discuss"
the League was Poindexter.
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against a policy so new and so opposed to that which he had
always believed In end cherished."

JUnerioans were not at

this time opposed to the League of Nations, hut be pointed
out that the objections which had been raised with respect
to the original draft had not been met when the Covenant
was revised.

20

In examining the various provisions, senator Sterling
noted that a provision had been inserted in the revised
Covenant (in Article 1) which would allow the United States
to withdraw from the League on two years notice, provided
that Its international obligations and its obligations
under the Covenant bad been fulfilled.

But, he feared, to

accept this provision would be a surrender of national
sovereignty, because obligations to all the covenants which
the United States had entered into since its independence
would have to be fulfilled before it could withdraw from
this supreme Covenant.

American peace end safety, for ex

ample, might be grounds for withdrawal, but because of this
Impasse of unfulfilled obligations end obligations under
the Covenant itself, all bound together by a strong chain
of supergovernment. It would be impossible for the United
States ever again to regain its freedom and sovereignty.^^

Ibid.. 3607-8. These remarks by Sterling were made
in iiUgust, 1919, by which time the public seemed to favor
ratification with reservations.
Zllbid.. 3608.
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Discussing the constitutionality of League membership,
Sterling asserted that it was beyond the power of the senate
or the Executive to negotiate a treaty which surrendered the
power of the nation to judge for itself whether it had ful
filled, or whether it should fullfill a treaty obligation.
If a foreign power should control or supervise the actions
of the United States in regard to its international obli
gations, how could it be said, he asked, that this was a
sovereign state?

Or if, by this restriction in Article 1,

Congress could not abrogate a treaty which it considered
burdensome, or with respect to which conditions bed altered,
what difference would there be between that case end one by
which the legislation of one nation, in respect to foreign
affairs, was binding upon another?

In either case, there

would be a loss of the very crown of sovereignty— the right
of a nation to direct for itself its international rela
tions.^^
Sterling protested that those who endorsed the
Covenant as it stood advanced the claim that a radical
change was necessary in America»s existing political and
international policies.

They maintained that even though

the United States had long adhered to the principle of
non-interference in the affairs of Europe, the nation
must now suddenly depart from that policy.

They further

claimed that it must be ready to participate in an economic

^^Ibld.. 3608.
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or military war against any nation which violated the terri
torial integrity or the political independence of any nation
which was e member of the League of Nations.
Previous to this immediate era, sterling recalled, it
was highly improbable that any person, senator or otherwise,
would have dared suggest a program which would have imposed
upon the United states the obligations which were incorpora
ted in Article 10 of the present Covenant.

Or at least no

such obligation would have been accepted without due consi
deration of the rl^teousness of the cause of that nation
whose territorial integrity or political independence had
been violated, or, without consideration of the distance, or
of the expenses end sacrifices which such interventions
would involve.

24

■For those who desired such an Immediate and precipi
tate departure from our traditional policies, sterling fur
ther urged that the vicious system which had brought about
the great war was altogether unusual and abnormal.

Its

prime cause, he said, was Prussianism, and Prusslanlsm had
met its 7/aterloo.

But Americans acted as if the battle had

been a draw, and the theory that might makes right was still

^^Ibid.. S609.
Articles 10 and 16.

These obligations were embodied in

^"^Ibid,. 3609. Elihu Root advanced a similar argu
ment against intervention, namely that the United states
should not "set aside its traditional policy of non-inter
ference in Europena affairs" unless there were "sufficient
affirmative reasons for doing so." Jessup, 391-2,
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formidable.

They seemed to believe, he said, that the evil

spirits of ÎJletzsche and Bernhard1 still Imposed their vicious
ways upon the Germans through the will of a kaiser, and that
perhaps some other nation was now impregnated with the same
spirit of conquest and aggrandizement.

25

But Sterling's conviction was that no such menace
could threaten the world for at least a generation to come,
Even If It should, he asked, who would doubt that the Ameri
can people, inspired as they had been so recently, would
come fully armed, without the compulsion of a league of
nations, to fight for liberty and justice?

The Americans,

he urged, had been Inspired by their own ideals end they
had fought in defense of their own principles.

And the

glory of it all was that the Americans had participated
freely and of their own will, and not by the will of a
foreign tribunal whose power could determine when we were
to come to the aid of the Serb, the Croat, Slam, Eejaz or
Persia,

The United States would offer Its services when

ever they were needed, but it would do so at Its own
volition, through "Congress assembled and sworn to support
26
the Constitution of the United i>tates.
After a brief attack on the Bhantung settlement.
Sterling tempered his opposition to the Covenant by pointing

^^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 3610.
26
Ibid,. 3610.
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out that the people of Europe were fully ewsre of the origin
of the Monroe Doctrine end other time-honored American poli
cies.

And because of their familiarity with these policies,

he believed that they certainly would not object to reserva
tions which would leave to the United states Congress the
right to determine wh^jWTSi> or not this country should inter27
fere in the affairs of the other nations of the world.
Senator Wesley Jones, in the midst of a long speech,
declared that iunericans had entered the war as patriots,
end that in emerging from it, they should remain Americans,
Therefore, neither partisanship nor personal prejudice should
have any place in the consideration of the treaty.

He in

sisted that the treaty should be considered in an American
spirit end with a sincere devotion to American ideals end
American good.

In deciding what was and what wee not

iimericenism In our dealings with other nations, nothing
could be worse than a division on party lines.
But nevertheless, Jones held, the attitude of Pres
ident Wilson was culpable on many points.

He, Wilson,

expected the Senate to ratify the treaty just as it stood
end without consideration of it.

The President "knew it

all," and was under the impression that his Covenant was

2?lbld.. 3611.
In a short statement. Sterling also
denounced the Shantung settlement.
Ibid.. 3611.
28ibid.. 6333.
the revised Covenant.

This speech was made in regard to
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impossible of improTsment•

Then when the Senate proceeded

to discuss and analyse the Covenant in pursuance of its
patriotic and constitutional duties, he threatened that body
with the "wrath of the people,"

He began his tour of the

country seeking to force the nation to obey his will with
out consideration of the merits or demerits of the docu
ment.^®
Jones held, moreover, that Wilson, while defending
democracy, actually practiced autocracy.

He had named him

self peace commissioner, and the associates which he chose
were "mere dummies."

And in order to have his way, he had

so entwined the treaty and the League Covenant together
that it would have been impossible to ratify one without
the other.

Lastly, he attempted to use industrial restive

ness, business chaos, the desire for peace end the desire
for the return of the American soldiers as means to force
ecoption of the League,
To Jones this attitude was unworthy of any greet men
and was an assault upon the fundamentals of the American
government.

Actually, he said, it was Wilson's undoing.

It threatened to defeat the Covenant and it had enabled
the other nations to obtain Wilson's sanction of their

Id., 6332-3, A reference to Wilson's tour of
the west in September, 1919,
S^Ibld,. 6332.
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**ooT«tou8 desires, the violation of his lofty Ideals, and
left him but a shadow of his Idealistic dreams."

He was

forced to approve of the Shantung settlement, and to allow
Britain to remain the "undisputed mistress of the seas" In
order that he have his League.

And on top of this, all the

other nations entered the League hoping to use American
blood to guard Europe end to use American money to pay
their debts and their war expenses.

31

There were three facts In the President's life,
Jones observed, which would make one reluctant to follow
him and which would furnish an interesting "psychological"
study for the future.

Wilson, for example, always said

those things which the occasion seemed to demand In order
to attain his ends.

He could be quoted by anyone to uphold

a position on "any question from the days of Washington to
the present."

Also, he had been quite consistent, since

his accession to the presidency, in giving in to the de
mands of the British Empire— from the question of the
Panama Canal tolls to the freedom of the seas— and to the
frank admission of the supremacy of British sovereignty
and citizenship.

32

i M É * » 6333. The freedom of the seas was the
second of Wilson's Fourteen Points, but because of British
opposition, it was not discussed at Paris. Bailey, The
Lost P eace. 367.
52Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 6333. Wilson had long been an admirer of British
institutions.
Bailey, Diplomatic History. 615.
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Jones believed that President Wilson, regrettably,
had done more by word and by deed to "undermine orderly,
peaceful representative government than any other human
agency."33
Jones insisted that the Covenant would not be re
jected so long as the vital Interests of the United States
were well protected, and that the peace end progress of the
world would be promoted even at the expense of the Presi
dent's vanity.

The good parts of the Covenant, he said,

would be retained, and most of what was bad would be
rejected;
%hen we consent to It with such changes as we think
best for our country's good, It will rest with the
President whether the concurrence of the other coun
tries shell be sought. Be can refuse It or not as be
sees fit. If the world's heart is broken, he will
break It. If the world's hope of peace shall die,
he will kill It.34
Analysing the terms of the treaty, Jones began with
the voting power of the British Empire.

The Empire had been

given six votes In the Assembly and the United States re
ceived only one.

But whenever nations were dealing with

one another, each should be the equal of any other.

This

rule should be observed regardless of a nation's size or
power.

35

^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 6333.
34
Ibid.. 6334. Evidently a reference to the clause
In the Lodge reservations regarding the acceptance thereof.
SSlbld., 6334.
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The Covenant, he continued, destroyed this principle
of equality.

One nation was set apart as a sovereign power

superior to all others.

The British Empire was a permanent

member of the Council, and by its one vote could block action
on any important matter.

It was also represented on the

Assembly by six votes, each one of which could also block
action on almost any matter.

26

Secondly, in the case of a nation’s withdrawal that
nation should be the sole judge of whether it had fulfilled
its obligations under the Covenant, and it should be held
to those obligations just as nations had always been so
held.
Nor, said Jones, was the clause which safeguarded the
Monroe Doctrine really adequate.

On a matter of such trem

endous importance no uncertainties should exist.

The Monroe

Doctrine, he said, was no defined in the treaty, and such
a definition should not be left in the hands of a council
of other nations.

The United states alone should be the

judge of what the Monroe Doctrine was, since it was purely
an American policy.

Indeed, it was an American domestic

policy, promulgated and adhered to for our own peace and
protection, and our people would not relinquish it nor
would they allow anyone else to interpret it.

Jones in

sisted that this point should be made clear to all nations
in any covenant entered into by the United States, just as

SGibid.. 6334.
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there should be no uncertainty regarding the subjection of
our domestic questions to the jurisdiction of the League.

37

Concerning action advised by the Council of the
League, Jones maintained that the United states would be
morally bound to adhere to a decision of the Council when
ever the American representative had given his consent to
that decision.

Therefore this country should be very care

ful of what promises It made, because no congress, with
public support behind It, would ever send American troops
abroad, except for a cause which directly affected American
peace and safety.

Moreover, American political Independence

should be preserved Inviolate, so that whatever the nation
chose to do. It would be saved from even the appearance of
dishonorable actions.

38

Jones further urged that Article 10 should not be
In the Covenant at all.

This article could be removed and

the rest of the Covenant would remain unaffected.

We

would have a league containing all the powers and duties
In the Covenant except the provision which guarded against
external aggression.

After all, with restrictions on arma

ments end the arbitration of disputes through the Council,
there would be little danger of aggression.

The Covenant

in this way would be a good beginning In the promotion of

3 ?lbld.. 6335.
SQjbld.. 6336.
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peaoe, and at the same time It would not pledge this country
to meddle In aggressive actions all over the world.

Eut

Article 10 as It was then written, rather than being the
heart of the League, was merely the "safeguard of the fruits
of an autocratic oligarchy."®®
With the usual jab at the Shantung agreement (the
"deed of eternal infamy"), Jones continued by urging that
the treaty should be disposed of as soon as was possible
in the case of such an important matter, so that all the
other problems which confronted the nation could be given
attention without

delay.

And then.
The danger to the covenant today comes from the
President himself.
It rests with him and the friends
of a league of nations whether we enter it or not.
He insists that the covenant must be accepted by the
Senate exactly as he has sent it to us. I know and
his friends know end he ought to know that if reser
vations .are not adopted the covenant will be rejected
in its entirety.
If, instead of trying to arouse the
people against the Senate, he would seek to reach a
fair and honorable understanding with it, there would
be little trouble. . .While he has been seeking to
arouse the people against them, Senators have been
studying the question. . .determined that reserva
tions must be made to safeguard the rights, the
welfare, the peace
and honor of this country.
These reservations
are going to be adopted. . .and
if the treaty is not ratified and the United States
fails to enter the league of nations, Woodrow Wilson,
President of the United states, alone will prevent it.

3®Ibid.. 6336. Probably a reference to Britain's
alleged use of this article to hold down her dominions or
parts of empire.
40lbid.. 6337.
41lbid., 6337.
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On the day before the November votes on the treaty,
Jones made a last bid by reoommendlng four additional
reservations of his own making:
He proposed that China be given complete sovereignty
over Shantung, that Anglo-Irish relations be adjusted "to
the satisfaction of the Irish people," that Egypt, which
had Just been made a protectorate of Great Britain, should
receive complete independence, and that each member of the
League abolish conscription in

p e a c e t i m e .

^2

Such was the stand taken by Wesley Jones of Washing
ton, the strongest of the Northwest reservationists and a
good example of the kind of opposition which confronted
Wilson in the Senate.
Sterling, Warren and Jones agreed on a number of
Important issues.

Each was determined that, if the United

States should join the League, it should reserve the right
to withdraw any time it pleased.

Each was determined that

Article 10 was not going to be binding upon this country in
any way repugnant to traditional American policies or to
the detriment of American sovereignty.

Also, they were all

agreed that the Monroe Doctrine was to remain, as it always
had been, the unilateral policy of the United states.

Jones

and Warren voiced dissatisfaction with British voting power
In the Assembly and both were apprehensive about the safety

42lbid. . 8747. These reservations were rejected by
the Senate.
Ibid.« 8748.
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of American Jurladictlon over its domestic affairs.

Finally,

all were agreed that the Shantung settlement was an injus
tice and that it should not be accepted "without some word
of protest,"
Giving form to the substance of their opposition,
the Lodge reservations sufficiently satisfied these sena
tors so that they consented to a "limited liability" parti
cipation by the United States in the League of Nations.
The first Lodge reservation allowed the United States
to be the sole judge of whether it had fulfilled its obli
gations, in case it wished to withdraw.

The second reserved

.to the United States Congress the final voice in accepting
or rejecting any obligation or decision made in pursuance
of Article 10 or any other part of the Covenant.

Number

four allowed the United States to be the exclusive judge in
deciding what questions were within its domestic jurisdic
tion, and the fifth made the United States the sole inter
preter of the llonroe Doctrine.

Concerning Shantung, the

United States refused, by the sixth reservation, to assent
to the Shantung settlement and reserved "full liberty of
action with respect to any controversy,

. .between the

Republic of China and the Empire of Japan."

And in regard,

Implicity, to British voting power, the fourteenth reserva
tion, in its final form, stated that until the United States
should receive an equal number of votes, it would not be
bound by any decision of the Council or the Assembly when
Great Britain and its dominions or parts of empire in the
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aggregate had cast more then one vote.

It further provided,

in effect, that in any dispute between the United states and
Great Britain, the United Btates would not be bound by any
decision or report if Great Britain or any part of its
empire had voted.
Were it not for the Lodge reservations, these strong
reservationists might never have consented to ratification
of the treaty.

Drawn to its logical conclusion, the oppo

sition of these senators would be identical to that of the
outright opponents.

Except for the statements by the strong

reservationists which actually defended the League of Nations,
the speeches of the two groups are almost indistinguishable.

reservation on Shantung did not grant full
Chinese control of shantung as Jones, for example, would
have wished.
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a U P T E B IV
MILD RESERVATIONISTS
The attitudes of the two mild reservationists in the
Northwest, Charles L. McNary of Oregon and Porter J. MoCumber
of North Dakota, constitute a radical departure from those
of the strong reservationists.

To both of these senators,

the Covenant was a noble instrument, sufficient in strength
possibly to provide for a peaceful world order, and at the
same time not so binding as to subject the United States to
the caprice of foreign powers.

They sew no objection to the

nation's assumption of the responsibilities of a family of
nations and, in their enthusiasm for its benefits, they
seldom found reason to distrust or fear the intentions of
other countries.

With the memory of the recent war still

fresh in their minds, their interest in preventing another
such catastrophe was quickened.

Unlike so many, they were

not BO sure that the United States could afford to be in
different^ to ell but the welfare of its own interests.
These men. Republicans, were among the most ardent
friends of the League on either side of the chamber,

sena

tor McNary declared himself in favor of any effort to en
sure peace and he declared himself soundly in favor of the
Covenant of the League of Nations.

His position was one

between "general statements of the sublimities of peace,"
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and "indulging with owlish wisdom the ominous predictions of
a disgraced and destroyed Republic."^

By the adoption of

harmless, interpretive reservations, he maintained, such
questions as domestic matters, the Monroe Doctrine and
obligations of war without consent of Congress could be
2
placed beyond the sphere of controversy*
Senator MoCumber
revealed an equally favorable judgment of the League when he
explained that he supported a number of the Lodge reserva
tions, not because he necessarily agreed with them, but
because he felt that they were necessary to secure enough
g
votes for ratification.
He also believed that the reser
vations were not so strong as to kill the treaty and that
they were mild enough actually to gain support for the
treaty from both parties.^

He maintained that the League

of Nations was so foreign to any kind of partisanship that
its consideration should not have been influenced by hos5
tility toward or subserviency to the President.
On these
grounds he pleaded with the Democrats to compromise, just

^Congressional Record, 66 Congress, 1 session,
LVIII, 2983.
^Ibid.. 2985.
^Ibid.. 8561.
4lbid.. 8786.
^Senate Report No. 176, Part 3, Senate Reports, I,
September 10, 1919.
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g
as he himself was willing to do.

In reviewing the attitudes of these two senators,
their arguments are found to be, in substance, very similar
to those of the Democratic proponents of the League.

Each

looked upon the League of Nations as the only possible in
strument for the maintenance of peace, and each undertook
coldly and rationally to analyse the provisions in the
Covenant to attempt to point out the deceptiveness in the
attacks of the stronger opponents.

Each believed that the

efficacy of the League of Nations was more than an illusion
and that the Dnited States, by joining, would have nothing
to lose and perhaps much to gain.
Senator McNary chose to discuss the focal points of
the controversy.

The questions of constitutionality,

national sovereignty and the ramifications of Article 10
were the main themes of his declamations.
He first challenged the objection that Article 10
collided with our constitution and that it ran contrary to
path of our sacred traditions.

The Council of the League,

he asserted, could only advise on what action should be
taken in case of an aggression by one state against another.
After that advice was rendered, he said, it was up to the
individual members to adopt the recommendation if they
wished, though if the means were practical and just, most

•^onRresslonel Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 8786.
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of the nations would probably follow It.

And Inasmuch as

the obligations under Article 10 were only moral In character,
the United States would not have to go to war unless, in case
of an aggression, that aggression violated "the moral con7
science of the /mierloan people."
McNary pointed out that, under Article IX, Section £
of the United States Constitution, the President was em
powered, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
treaties, provided that two-thirds of the senators present
concurred.

And further, under Article VI all treaties were

declared to be a part of the supreme law of the land.

It

was clear, he said, that the founders of the Constitution
were quite generous In the power they conferred upon the
Executive In the matter of treaty making.
this treaty making power was not unlimited.

But, said McNary,
It had been

decided by the supreme Court that nothing could be done In
pursuance of a treaty which was forbidden by the Constitu
tion.®

It was therefore impossible, be said, that the

treaty making power could usurp those prerogatives of the
legislature which had been conferred on that branch by the
fundamental law of the land.

He argued that when the Con

stitution provided how and by what means war should be de
clared, the agency responsible for such a declaration was

Tibia.. 2983.
Qlbld.. 2983.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

86
meant to operate in an exclusive field, and its right to
function in that field "can not be abrogated, lessened, or
enlarged by the treaty-making power."

Hence the executive

and the Senate could not obligate the United States to a
future declaration of war on any nation, regardless of the
justness of the case.

Moreover, McNary stressed, interna

tional law recognized the constitutional limitations under
which a nation made its treaties, and it was legally binding
upon the signatories to the Covenant to respect those limita9
tions.
There was no doubt, he continued, as to the extent
end nature of the obligations imposed by Article 10.

The

United States would be under a moral bond to fulfill its
own obligations and to go to war, if necessary, whenever
war was justified.

In fact, he said, in any future case of

wanton aggression by one nation against another, such an
aggression would arouse the moral sentiments of the American
people to the point of persuading Congress to declare war.
But actually, he continued. Article 10 called for action
only after more peaceful methods had been employed, as
Articles 11 through 17 provided for such settlements as
mediation, arbitration, adjudication and economic boycotts.
And finally, if Article 10 should be used, it would be
binding only when the American people felt morally justified

Glbid.. 2983.
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in stopping a given act of aggression,
Nor, said McNary, did Article 10 have the power to
interfere with the internal affairs of a nation, because by
Article 15, Section 7, such things were placed beyond League
jurisdiction.

Also, he recalled, the supreme Court had de

cided that by the rules of international law, such subjects
as the tariff and immigration were solely within the juris
diction of this country and impossible of alienation by
^

treaty.

11
McNary asserted that the League of Nations Covenant

should be the fundamental law of nations, operating in a
universal field as our own organic law did in this country.
The document, he conceded, only defined general princi
ples for the conduct of the various governments, and left
matters of procedure end administration to rules to be
issued by the Council and the Assembly.

But within this

League of Nations, he said, there would arise a new code
of international law and justice which would guide the
nations along the path which led to the peaceful settle
ment of all international disputes end which avoided
those controversies which resulted in war.

The League of

Nations, he concluded, was the greatest step which ever
had been taken toward peace, and as such was the "hope of

lOlbid.. 2984.
lllbid.. 2984.
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the world,
Of all the members of the United States Senate,
Porter J, MoCumber was perhaps the most relentless In his
efforts to secure ratification of the treaty.

Surely he

was among the most profoundly convinced that the League of
Nations was, as McNary called it, the "hope of the world,"
He was perhaps the senator who was farthest removed from
any partisan spirit, at least on his own side of the cham
ber.

Besides being the only Republican to vote for the

treaty without the reservations, as a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee he broke with his own (Republican)
majority, and submitted a report on the treaty which con
tained both an excoriation of the Lodge faction and a com
mendable defense of the principles which the League Covenant
embodied.
In pleading for acceptance of the League of Nations,
Me Cumber ranged, in his arguments, over almost every rami
fication of the issue, moral end political.

Like McNary

and others, he did his best to vindicate those provisions in
the Covenant which bad been the objects of the most severe
criticism.

Also he believed that it was the bounden duty

of the American people to realise that the nations of the
modern world were so interdependent as to preclude any
notion of selfish isolation.

He was convinced that the

United States could lose nothing by becoming a member of

l^Ibld.. 2985,
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the League, and he was keenly aware of the consequences if
the nations of the modern world did not unite in a concerted
effort to preserve peace.
Less than two months after the Armistice, MoCumber
took his stand as an outright advocate of some kind of
organization for the maintenance of international security:
. .the world looks with hopeful eyes to this
Peace Commission for some international arrangement
that will make impossible another such war.
We have
seen the thunderbolt of war shot from the serenest skies
of peace.
We have seen nations basking in the sun of
tranquility suddenly swept by the hurricane of a life
and death struggle.
We have seen more than four years
of the most devasting and sanguinary, the most savage
and brutal battles that have ever blackened the earth.
And as we reach its close, even the shouts of the vic
tors are drowned by the lamentations of mothers, the
weeping of fatherless children, by the anguished sobs
of millions upon millions of poor bereaved mortals
, . .1 am optimistic enough to believe that great
world wars can be prevented, and that the time to
present and adopt the restrictive and preventive
measures is now and not some indefinite time in the
future— is today, when the awful horrors and conse
quences of war are apparent to every heart— and not
when those horrors are forgotten and only the mili- ,
tary glamor and glory remain to influence the senti
ments of humanity."15
When the debates on the League of Nations were well
under way, MoCumber remained throughout a staunch friend of
the Administration, in so far as the League was concerned.
Unlike so many Republicans and some Democrats, he nourished
no fears, real or fancied, of an American surrender of
sovereignty.

Nor did he entertain those views that American

participation would embroil this country in countless

^^Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,
L7II, 1083.
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quarrels beyond the frontiers of its own interest.

By contrast

with so many, he was strikingly modern in his appreciation of
the fact that the world was such as to necessitate an active
interest in its affairs by the United states.
In challenging the arguments of the opposition, McCumber mentioned that the opponents of the League had as
serted that the quarrels of Europe were no concern of ours.
Nothing, he believed, could be farther from the truth.

The

murder at Sarajevo in 1914 had precipitated a war which
cost the United States the lives of over fifty-thousand
boys, and imposed upon the country a debt of forty-billion
dollars, a debt which eventually would increase to one
hundred-billion,

was it possible, he asked, that such a

conflict la Europe was one which did not concern usf

Or

could the United States remain indifferent to the possibil
ity, Indeed the probability, that another and yet worse war
would ravage the earth?
MeCumber reminded the Senate that about twenty-million
people had died as a result of the recent war.

Only a small

proportion of these had been Americans, but they were all of
the same blood and of the seme ambitions, hopes and aspira
tions, and in them all the "love of life was equally strong,"
Now all those hopes and aspirations were buried with mangled
bodies, end there were yet those who contended that the war
was no concern of ours,^^

^^Congressional Record. £6 Congress, 1 session
LVIII, 1264.
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The United States, he admitted, #as secure in its
isolation and in its vast resources end population, but that
security, he said, did not excuse the United States from its
obligations toward the less fortunate peoples of the world.
It was the divinely imposed duty of this country to shield
the weak end to compel international right.
It was MoCumber*8 belief that there was no morel
duty binding upon any man which was not equally binding
upon one nation in its relations with other nations.

There

fore, he continued, what was needed at this time was an
international law on the subject, a law which would declare
that war by one nation was a matter of concern for ell the
others.

It should expressly forbid an unjust war to be

waged by any nation.

And such, he said, was the exact

purpose of the League of Nations.

15

Without the League of Nations, he continued, the
understanding that a war of annihilation by one nation
against another was no concern to the rest of the world,
would continue to prevail.

It would continue to be under

stood that no nation was bound to defend the cause of the
weak.

He pointed out that the United States itself, for

example, did not enter the late war on a great world
principle.

Never a word was uttered about the entrance

of this country being for the cause of humanity.

It

entered solely because Germany, by her actions, had made

ISlbld.. 1265,
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wer upon us., Once we were In, be admitted, we claimed that
we were fighting for a great cause, but it was really that
1 ft
cause for which we entered.
McCumber believed that the United states should be
placed in such a position that it would never again have to
reiterate a falsehood in order to vindicate itself in the
eyes of its own people end in the eyes of the world.

It

should be in such a position that it could say, ’’under the '
letter of this bond and for the defense of this principle
we command you to halt your armies, and to maintain that
principle we will consecrate the blood of our men, the tears
of our women, and every resource of our Nation.
McCumber also lamented that the war was carried on
so far from American shores that the people knew little of
its horrors and of the destitution which it left behind.

He

maintained that if the American people could only realize
the sufferings of one dying soldier, if they could view the
agonies of a drowning man, or if they could view the millions
of armless, legless, eyeless men, destined to suffer for the
rest of their lives, then nothing in the world could prevent
the immediate demand for such a combination of the peoples
of the world as would prevent a repetition of such a catas
trophe.^®

IGibid.. 1265.
l?Ibid.. 1265.
IBlbld.. 1265-6.
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The Covenant of the League of Nations, he said, repre
sented the deliberations of nations large and small.

It

dealt with complex situations in Europe, both racial and
political.

It came to us as a compromise contract, which

all the nations believed would accomplish the purpose of
preserving the peace.

To secure the support of this coun

try, special concessions had been made.

The Monroe Doctrine,

for example, which had never met the approval of any nation
save Great Britain, was "by this instrument given a world
sanction.
McCumber admitted that the Covenant was not a perfect
document; it did not definitely convey all its purposes.
But he believed that it was certainly not susceptible to
the construction which many of the opponents had used upon
it.

Nor were the criticisms based upon the constructions

anything but false.

He believed that there were few in

stances wherein an Idea had been so unjustifiably and so
savagely assailed.

20

In a sweeping defense of all the provisions, McCumber
began by saying that the attacks on Article 10 had been with
out foundation.

An agreement to respect the right to live

88 a nation, he maintained, the inviolable right of terri
tory, was the very basis of international peace.

He realized

that however a nation chose to administer its internal

19ibid.. 1267.
SOlbid.. 1267.
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affairs was a matter of its own concern, and with such things
the League had nothing to do.

But what the League could and

should do was to warn all the other nations to keep their
hands to themselves.

Also, he recalled, it had been asserted

again and again that by Article 10, the United states would
be compelled to help Great Britain hold down all her domin
ions as against their own internal rebellions or revolutions.
This argument, be said, was also false.

Any British posses

sion or part of the Empire could assert and maintain its
freedom, end the United States would be in no wise obligated
to come to the aid of the mother country.

The League of

Nations assured protection only against external aggression.
Secondly, he noted, in all the arguments against the
League, there was much talk of the powers which the United
States would lose if it should join such an organization.
Yet he also recalled that never a word was mentioned about
the powers which would be surrendered or restrained by all
the other nations of the world.

Actually, he said, when a

nation agreed with another nation to do that which it had
the right to decline to do, it did not, by that agreement,
surrender its independence or sovereignty.

It merely held

itself honor bound not to exercise its sovereign rights,
for the duration of the compact, on those subjects covered
by the agreement.
21lb i d .. 1268-9.

22ibid.. 1270.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

95
It was also claimed, be said, that the provision In
the Covenant (Article 8) which provided for disarmament among
the members, the nations of Europe would control our own pro
duction of armaments.

To begin with, he continued, there

was too much jealousy among the European powers ever to
enable them effectively to combine against us.

But more

Important, he stressed, since the Council of the League
could only formulate plans for the "consideration and
action of the several governments," each nation had to
agree separately to whatever limitations might be pre
scribed.

Hor, he said, was the constitutional right of

Congress to raise and support armies Infringed upon or
limited by this article.

Congress, he urged, would have

to adopt any plan before the United States became even
morally bound.

For example, provision was made In the

Covenant that the Council should formulate a general plan
for disarmament, end this could only be effective when each
end every nation had agreed.

Article 8 was no more binding

upon the United States than upon any other party to the
agreement.
Concerning British voting power, McCumber recalled
that the opponents consistently overlooked the fact that
the British Empire had but one single vote In the Council,
and that the Council could act. In any substantive matter,
only by unanimous concurrence.

By this principle of

25lbld.. 1270-1.
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unanimityr he eeid, the United States could prevent additional
memhera (e.£. members of the British Empire) from being ad
mitted to the Council, because even though a majority of
the Assembly could approve new members, It was the Council
which named them.^^
Nor, he said, could disputes be removed to the Assembly
(as provided in Article 15) without the approval of the
United States in the Council, because such action also re
quired unanimous consent by the latter body.

He pointed

out that for such an action it was necessary that the appli
cation be made by one of the disputants, and that that
application be made within fourteen days after the submis
sion of the dispute to the Council.

The Council could then,

if it wished (there was no compulsion), refer the dispute
to the Assembly, and such a removal of a dispute was not
among the exceptions to the requirement for unanimous
consent as provided in Article 5.

Furthermore, it was

only on the merits of the question under dispute, be con
tinued, that the votes of the disputants were excluded
by Article 15, and even then, the unanimous verdict of
all the members remaining was required to indicate even
25
the judgment of the Council.
But, said McCumber, even if a dispute should be

24lbid.. 1271-2.
25lbld.. 1272. By the "judgment" of the Council
^^Ibld..
was meant the usual recommendation.
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referred to the Assembly, the United States bad nothing to
fear from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa.
Those Dominions comprised "people of the same inheritance,
the same ideals, the same aspirations," and it would be
unjust to deny them their votes in the Assembly.^®

Even

France, he said, the nation most jealous of its rights,
did not object to this so-called uneven voting power of
the British Empire.
Concluding on this subject. MoCumber further pointed
out that, if a dispute should be referred to the Assembly,
all the parts of the British Empire would be excluded if
that dispute involved any one of them.

And again, and

equally important, the strongest power possessed either
by the Council or the Assembly was that of making a recom28
mandation.
Coming to Article 11, he recalled that it had main
tained by the opponents that under this article, such
domestic questions as Immigration could be submitted for
consideration.

29

It held, for example, that China or

Japan might claim that an American exclusion law would

26ibld.. 1272.
2?Ibid.. 6439.
28ibld.. 6439. Mo Cumber's claim that the Dominions
would be excluded in a dispute involving any one of them
was not unequivocally supported in Article 15. His own
(6th) reservation attempted to clarify this discrepancy.
Supra. 24.
29lbld.. 1273.
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strain the friendship end good understanding between one or
both of those countries and the United Ltates,

This, he

asserted, was a groundless claim, es Section 7 of Article 15
stated:
If a dispute between the parties is claimed by one
of them, and is found by the Council tp arise out of
a matter which by international lew is solely within
the domestic Jurisdiction of that party, the Council
shell so report and shall make no recommendations as
to its settlement.
Domestic questions, he continued, were too many to
enumerate, but few could be disputed, and it was easy to
distinguish between those of domestic end those of inter
national character.

Immigration, for example, was defin

itely a domestic question.

But even if such a matter did

reach the Council, he stressed, it was to be remembered
always that the verdict of that body had to be unanimous
(excluding, of course, the parties to the dispute).

But

more important, he continued, if the members of the Council
did choose to conspire against the United States, each
nation would be committing an act of national suicide by
establishing such a precedent that would compel it to
place its own purely domestic affairs within the juris
diction of the League,^®
MoCumber also recalled that there were those sena
tors who pertinaciously held to the belief that the Monroe
Doctrine would be seriously endangered by the League of

SOibld.. 1273.
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Nations if ths United States should join.

This argument, he

said, «as also groundless:
While I deny that the Monroe doctrine ever meant any
thing more than is clearly included in the declaration
of President Monroe, X would not have this international
compact itself to define it. The framers of the league
of nations in the amendment have sought to meet the
objections made in this country that the Monroe doc
trine «as not recognized by specifically recognizing
it, 31
Therefore, he continued, there was written into the Covenant
the following words:
Nothing in this document shall be deemed to affect
the validity of international engagements such as
treaty obligations or regional understandings like
the Monroe doctrine for securing the maintenance of
peace.52
This inclusion. MeCumber believed, should satisfy any
reasonable man.

Certainly no one could demand that it go so

far as to define just what the Monroe Doctrine should mean
33
under all possible conditions.
Nor, he said, had the Monroe Doctrine ceased to be
a purely American policy or become a world agreement.

Ee

believed that the above-mentioned provision in the Covenant
was clear enough that other nations would recognize this,
as they always had, as an American Monroe Doctrine, simply
because there had never been any Monroe Doctrine other than

^^Ibid.. 1273.
32lbld.. 1273.
55lbld., 1273.
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ours.

34
Actually, MoCumber reminded the Senate, this policy

had too often been used as a policy of defiance rather than
one acceptable to other nations.

The purpose of the Monroe

Doctrine was solely to prevent the actual conquest of LatinAmerican countries by foreign nations and to prevent such
territories from being "bargained, sold, or given away to
any European power."
Returning to the Covenant itself, MeCumber explained
what be considered to be the reasons for the creation of
both a Council and an Assembly:

The nations of the world

were divided into two distinct groups— the great end power
ful and the small and less powerful, and also the stable
and reliable and the unstable and unreliable.

In each

case the great and powerful were the stable and reliable.
It was therefore obvious that the latter groups should be
the "backbone of this league."

But because the Council

could only include the strong powers, it was fitting and
proper that there should be some forum through which the
voices of all the nations could be heard.

To meet this

requirement, the Assembly as a distinct body was estab
lished, so that the woes and complaints of any country,
regardless of the backwardness or instability of its people

S^ibid.. 1273,
35ibld.. 1274.
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oould be heard.
It was M o Cumber*8 prediction that if the United States
should refuse to join the League, the great nations of the
world would then proceed to devise the means for the eventual
destruction of nations.

He prophesied that the nation which

was "most learned, most thorough, and assiduous" would under
take the manufacture of gas bombs which could wipe out a
city like New York, London, Paris or Berlin in a single raid.
He pointed out that the sciences of aircraft end chemical
warfare were at this time in their infancy, but the nation,
he believed, which was foremost in the development of such
Satanic engines would triumph over those nations which
would rebel against such hideous methods.
would be

60

The next war

desperate that all the ills created by the

last would be nothing in comparison.®'^

Therefore, he said,

I could not oast my vote against any reasonable
agreement to secure future world peace without a
conviction that would follow me to the grave, that
I had committed an unpardonable offence against all
future generations. . ."38
All that we can be sure of is that the instrument
comes to us as a compromise, and in it is the soul of
a future world freedom. It is within our power to
strangle the body, but the soul will live and ever
seek reembodiment in some future international or
ganization.®®
Both MoKary and MeCumber, as mild reservationists.

® ^Ibld.. 1274.
3 7ibld.. 1275.
®Qjbid.. 1276.
59lbld.. 1274.
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ere good examples of the more disinterested attitudes which
could be Aund among Republicans in the Senate of 1919.

Both

were members of that party, and it was that party which gave
to the League Covenant almost all of its strong opposition.
Bit neither of these senators allowed such party sympathies
to stand in the way of his own efforts to encourage the
United States to partake of the duties, obligations and
benefits of the proposed new world order.
MoCumber, in particular, stood alone as the senator
most exemplary in his efforts to convince everyone that the
United States should join what he considered a positive end
workable system for the preservation of world peace.

He

was the senator most visibly immune to the ties of party
prejudice, and for that he deserves much commendation.
The strong and fervent pleas for ratification of the
treaty by these men were not unlike the equally fervent
pleas of many of the Democrats.

Just as the strong reser

vationists and the irreconcilables were often closely
related, MoNary and MoCumber were just as closely allied,
in spirit, to the Administration Democrats.
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GHAPTEH V
ADMINISTRATION DEMOCRATS
With the exoeption of Senator Myers of Montana, who
showed no real concern over the League question, the North
west Democrats were all ardent champions of International
cooperation.

The most famous of these was Thomas J. Walsh,

also of Montana.

John F. Nugent of Idaho was conspicuous,

end Edwin £, Johnson of South Dakota, though a strong friend
of the League, was less outstanding.
Like MoNary and MoCumber, each was a man of fore
sight, and believed that the League of Nations was a posi
tive step toward international peace.

Each also was con

vinced that it was the duty of the United States to join
that organization.

Senator Johnson, in his plea for

ratification, confined most of his remarks to the moral or
ideological aspects of the issue.

Walsh and lAigent, however,

were more realistic in that they departed from this phase
of the question and grappled with the roots of the contro
versy in an attempt to dispel certain doubts and fears which
were raised by the attacks of the opposition.

Both these

men, as well as Myers, were not unwilling to compromise and
ratify the treaty with the Lodge reservations attached.
Walsh distinguished himself as a member of the bipartisan
conference in January, 1920, by an attempt to cooperate
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with Senator Lodge In order to bring about an agreement be
tween the opposing factions.

Agreement was never reached,

but unlike many Democrats including Johnson, walsh, along
with Nugent and Eîyers, preferred loyalty to the cause
rather than deference to the President.
Senator Myers made few remarks on the League of
Nations except at a very late date.

Judging by the speeches

he did make, it is doubtful that he made much of an im
pression on the Senate.

As early in the strife as December,

1919, when the controversy had been raging for about a year,
he observed that, in his opinion, there was "politics on
both sides in the contest."^

But on the same day he de

clared his willingness to vote for most of the reservations
2
"in the interest of compromising and getting together."
It was this spirit which brought Myers to the conclusion
that the League of Nations was worth a try.
But the League of Nations to begin with, he said,
had failed miserably.

It had not even the strength to

force the Dutch to give up the Kaiser so that he could be
tried.

Nor had it yet forced the Germans— who were all

guilty of atrocities— to surrender the other offenders.
And to expect the Germans themselves to try them (!) was
unthinkable.

It would be like putting a "bootlegger on

^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIZ, 738.
Sjbld.. 738.
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trial before a Jury of bootleggers."

2

la answer to those who contended that the peace terms
were too harsh, Myers deftly replied that they were too
lenient.

The German people themselves, he believed, were

as much to blame as the Kaiser, because they were perfectly
willing to follow him.

Moreover, for generations, he said,

the German people had been drinking toasts to "Der Tag,"
the day when they would embark upon a campaign of world
conquest.

Therefore the armistice with Germany was the

"greatest mistake in the history of the world in a thousand
years.
Germany should have been brought to the earth and
ground into the dust of the earth, so that she would
not have any spirit to revive in a thousand years to
come. The German nation should have been dismembered,
the States that comprised it should have been sepa
rated and forbidden. . .to constitute any langer a
central power under one general government.
Myers also noticed another proposition whereby the
League would be gravely at fault.

It seemed that there was

a desire on the part of some to admit Germany as a member.
Nothing, he believed, could be more repugnant.
X never heard before, if a brute of a monster ra
vishes your wife and your daughter, when he is arrested
for it and it is proven on him, that you should Invite
him into your home and to your dinner table. . •
And because it was also rumored that help was to be sent to

Sibid.. 4585-6.
% b i d .. 4586-7.
Sibid.. 4587.
Gibld.. 4587.
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Bolshlvlst Russia through the League of Nations and that Great
Britain was going to recognize that country, î.îyers held, there
was further room for diaappointment in the League.

Extermina

tion, he believed, should hold for Russia as well as for
n

Germany. '
In spite of it all, however, Myers managed to see
some good in the League.

There were provisions in the Coven

ant which he heartily opposed and there were also many re
servations which likewise did not meet his approval.

Yet

there was a ray of hope, and on that hope he would place
his faith.

If the great and powerful United States should

join the League of Nations, he said, conditions might be
come better.

We could ”bring the world out of the chaos

which now prevails and the abyss into which it is rapidly
sinking deeper and more helplessly."

6

Clear as ever, Myers

concluded:
So I have determined once more to vote for ratification
of this pact.
I have voted for it twice and I am going
to vote for it once more, and if it fails of ratifica
tion this time, I do not know whether I shall ever vote
for it again.
If I should occasion to vote for ir ag^in,
as I hope I may not, for I hope it may be ratified this
time, I think I would have to have some proof, more
then I have had, of the efficacy of the League of Na
tions in operation. . .Though I am not at all satis
fied with the workings of the League of itotions, and
am not satisfied with the pact itself, nor with all
of the reservations. . .yet, in the hope of bettering
conditions, I shall once more cast my vote for ratifi-

?Ibid.. 4587.
Bibid.. 4588.
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oation.

9
.And with that the matter rested,
Senator Johnson of South Dakota stated his belief that

membership in the League of Nations was the greatest quest)n
that the United States Senate had had to consider since the
formation of the government.

10

It was a question, he believed,

which would affect the welfare and happiness of the American
people 88 none had ever done before.
After many months of deliberation, he said, the peace
conference presented this "wonderful document," the League
of Nations Covenant, and upon his examination of its provi
sions, Johnson found that they were quite plain and clear.
Its efficacy, he said, was built upon the fact that fear of
the law, punishment and publicity was one of the most power
ful inducements to obedience by men and nations, and on the
fact that such a fear could compel obedience when necessary.
Considering the ineffable horrors and destructiveness
of the late war, end the almost complete ignorance of such
horrors on the part of the American people, Johnson main
tained that we had gained nothing by our contribution to
the victory if we should allow the old conditions to persist
so that the same sacrifices would have to be repeated.

Rati

fication of the treaty, he believed, was both a moral and

Sibid.. 4588.
^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 2985-8.
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national duty, and the oontentlon was false that the United
States could afford to ignore all but its own interests.
Moreover, he continued, no man or nation had ever been
strong enough to stand elone; such reasoning was that of a
selfish man or nation, and whoever accepted it would be
liable to the "just condemnation of all liberty-loving
people."
Johnson protested to the Senate that the world had-by
that time reached a period in scientific development wherein
the greatest cities in the United States could be destroyed,
along with their populations, by air attack.

Ee protested

that the isolated position which had been nature's gift to
America was no longer reliable as a safeguard against attack
by foreign foes.

Future wars, he predicted, would be fought

in the air end beneath the water, and they would be so com
plete in their destructiveness that the powers of good
government might cease to exist, and the world might then
be ruled by power, hate and brute force,

With these things

in mind, he said, the American people should not allow them
selves the luxury of imaginary security, nor should they
reject the very plan which might possibly end wars forever.
In December of 1919, after the treaty had suffered
its first defeat, Johnson undertook to blame the Republicancontrolled Houses of Congress plus a few Democrats for wast
ing an entire session of congress in their attempt to
destroy the only foundation for a lasting peace.

Domestic

conditions, he said, were worse than ever, end restiveness

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

109
and discontent were manifest, and Bolshevism, radicalism
and socialism were spreading throughout the land.

The gov

ernment was threatened, he said, from all sides, and the
people were impatiently waiting for attention while a few
men in the senate quarreled about the treaty.

Therefore,

he contended, if the people were to be served at that cri
tical hour, the treaty should be ratified at once so that
the serious internal problems could be given the proper
attention.

Delay in ratification, he pointed out, was

costing the government millions of dollars each day, to
say nothing of the loss of thousands of lives abroad.
Rejection of the League of Nations, Johnson con
cluded, would be an outright breach of faith with our
allies and associates, and we could rest assured that the
United States would pay the price of its foolishness.

He

maintained that by our first refusal (in November) to rati
fy the treaty we had turned our backs on our friends and
opened the door to our enemies, and that if we did not
reverse our attitude, it was possible that ell the Englishspeaking people in the world would be destroyed within the
next twenty years.

12

'

Like Senator Johnson, Senator Nugent of Idaho was
also convinced that the League of Nations, operating under

^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIZ, 178-9.
l^ibid.. 179.
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the provisions of the Covenant, would be quite able to pre
sent war entirely or at least to make war practically im
possible.

furthermore, he believed that if the United states

should fail to ratify the treaty and if, because of that
failure the League itself should die, the United States
alone would be to blame for the next war, which would "rock
1*5
the earth to its very foundation."
In my opinion the next world conflict will be one
of almost total annihilation of armies and extermina
tion of peoples because of the advances made by
scientific men in the art. . .of the destruction of
men and property. . .There is but one alternative to
the league of nations, and that is preparation for
war, which always means war eventually. Without the
league it will become necessary for us, and every
other nation to proceed armed to the teeth. We shall
be obliged to expend billions of dollars. . .in in
creasing the size of our Navy until it will be equal
to, or superior to, the navies of any two or three
nations that might combine against us. • .We shall
have imposed upon us a system of compulsory military
service. Our country will become a military camp.
There will be a soldier or a sailor on the back of
every taxpayer in the nation, end in the end there
will be another deluge of blood end grief and sorrow
and suffering in every village and hamlet throughout
the land.
Turning to more concrete issued, Nugent discussed the
question of constitutionality.

He reminded the senate, as

did many others, that under Article 10 the Council could
only advise on what measures should be taken in case the
territorial integrity of a nation should be threatened by
external aggression.

He believed that if war should be

Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 4259-60.
l*Ibid.. 4260.
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decided upon by the. Council there would be no usurpation of
the powers of Congress because the Congress elone was em
powered to decide whether or not the United states was
obligated to take that advice.

He also claimed that by

Article 8, which contained provisions for disarmament.
Congress again retained the ultimate power to adopt or
reject whatever plans might be formulated by the Council*

15

He admitted that If the United States should join
the League It would lose certain of Its rights which people
referred to as sovereign.

But the truth was, he said, that

all the other members of the League would lose Identical
rights and that therefore the members would be placed »*ln
the same position with respect to each other that we now
occupy as sovereign states."

16

It had been asserted by many, he recalled, that as
a member of the League, the United Ltates would become em
broiled in European wars.

And the men who made this asser

tion always invoked the policy and advice of Washington to
back up their claims.

But he reminded the Senate that

Washington's Farewell Address had been published In 1796
and had been "prepared In the light of world conditions as
they then existed," and that In 1919 the United States was
confronted with a situation entirely different from that
which previously obtained.

As such, therefore, the nation

ISlbld.. 4260.
IGibld.. 4261.
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was obliged to deal with it.

In Washington’s time, he said,

it required months to communloate with Europe, but now it
could be done in a matter of minutes, and in view of the
recent advances made in aviation it was obvious that
American isolation was a thing of the past.

Because of

these circumstances, he said, the United States had to take
its place among the nations of the world whether it liked
17
it or not.
Nugent asserted that
nations, like individuals, cannot stand still. They
must move either forward or backward. This above all
other ages is one of progress and development, and as
conditions change. • .policies must be changed so as
to conform to them. . .The war demonstrated that we
are not remotely, but immediately and vitally concerned
in the affairs of Europe, particularly in the quarrels
that may result in war, and that it is a matter of
supreme importance to us to bring about such a com
bination of nations as will make another such world
conflagration impossible.^®
The îtonroe Doctrine, be continued, should of course
be preserved, but he also believed that the provision in
Article 21 was perfectly sufficient to save it.

And Article

10, he maintained, was the heart of the Covenant, as its
enforcement was the only thing that could prevent the world
from bursting into flames.

After all, he asked, for what

had the United States used the Monroe Doctrine over the
years but to preserve the independence of the Latin American

l?Ibid.. 4261,
l®Ibid.. 4261.
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countries?

19

Also, he said, it was very foolish to fear the control
of domestic questions by the League, for such Jurisdiction
was forbidden by Article 15, and such things as tariffs,
immigration, naturalization, etc.. all were recognized by
international law as being domestic in character.

Moreover,

he believed, it was intended by the peace conference that
any withdrawing nation was to be the sole Judge as to whether
it had fulfilled its obligations.

He believed that the greet

powers represented on the Council would certainly not take
advantage of the United states on these or other questions.
Britain, France and Italy especially, he said, shared too
many sentiments with the United States ever to desire to
use the powers of the League to our disadvantage.

20

It was Nugent’s conviction that ratification of the
treaty was a moral obligation.

If the United states should

reject it, he said, such a decision would "lead certainly
and inevitably to a catastrophe more awful than that from
which we are now emerging."

21

Senator Walsh chose mainly to discuss the implications
of Article 10 and the Irish q u e s t i o n . A r t i c l e 10, he said,
was designed to protect a nation as against external aggree-

19lbid.. 4262.
GOlbld.. 4264.
^ 4 b l d . . 4265.
^^Ibld.. 3222-8.
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slon.

This last phrase, he noted, had been persistently

Ignored by many of the opponents In their arguments that
the article would be used to prevent a just internal up
rising or Insurrection.

But differing from the Koly Alli

ance, be said, the aim of which was to put down Internal
revolts and to preserve monarchlal and despotic rule, the
League of Nations Covenant limited Its members to the use
of war only In case of war by one nation against another.
It was urged, said Welsh, that Article 10 would pre
vent the United States from rushing to the aid of rebellious
subjects In another land.

It was claimed, for example, that

the League Covenant would have prevented the French from aid
ing the American colonists.

But this argument, he pointed

out, was raised on false grounds.

To begin with, he said,

the United states would have attained Its Independence with
or without the help of the French, for British statesmen
and historians were agreed that England at that time was
powerless to prevent secession.

Secondly, he reminded

the Senate, It was foolish to assume that France was In
any wise motivated by altruism when she sympathized with
the American cause.

Be pointed out that the sole purpose

of the French government was to diminish British power,
not to free America.
Actually, continued Walsh, disinterested Interven
tion on behalf of rebellious subjects was not borne out by
the facts.

It was not true, he said, in the case of France,

nor was It true when the United States Intervened In behalf
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of the Cuban inaurreotionlsts, especially considering that
we emerged with Porto Rico and the Philippines to balance
the cost.

On the other hand, he continued, ambitious rulers

with imperialistic aims had often used Intervention as a
pretext for assisting oppressed subjects, and oftentimes
internal uprisings had been fomented from abroad so as to
offer an excuse for an invasion which ended in conquest.
Walsh declared that the contrasting feature of the
League of Nations was that it was meant to be operated by
self-governing democracies, not by intriguing kings end
autocrats who were dominated with the idea of conquest.
For example, he said, if British colonial policy had been
in the eighteenth century what it had been in more modern
times, there probably would not have been an American
revolution.
Concerning Ireland, Walsh admitted that Article 10
would prevent a member of the League from coming to Irish
aid.

But he also admitted that the opponents who con

tinually broached the Irish question quite frequently did
so to arouse the prejudices of American citizens of Irish
birth or descent.

"It is worthy of remark," he said,

that those who most stoutly assail this feature of the
Covenant avow with almost equal vehemence and insisenoe that we must 'keep out of the quarrels of Europe.'
In one and the same breath they assert, in effect, that
if Ireland should rise in revolt against the tyranny of
Great Britain we would violate the most sacred precepts
of the fathers by participating in the strife, even in
aid of the Irish; yet they declaim against Article 10
because by it we agree not to do so.
To Walsh It was therefore plain that Ireland could
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expect no aid from the United States whether the treaty were
passed or not.

Nor, he said, could the Irish expect any

support from impotent Germany, England's ally Eranoe, or
weakened Spain.
To him the'hope for Irish independence lay In Article
1 1 , whereby a friendly power could bring the situation to the
attention of the League.

Also, he believed, Britain would

feel freer, with the League in operation, to grant Irish in
dependence because the alleged military danger of a free
Ireland would be removed by Article 10.
The Shantung problem offered a similar case, he con
tinued.

Article 10 had been condemned as a guardian of

the Shantung settlement.

Wilson himself, said Welsh, had

been accused of saving the League by presenting the Japs
with Shantung.

But Walsh argued that China could not be

helped by the defeat or removal of Article 10, for no
nation would send forces to take this province from Japan.
Actually, he said. Article 10 offered China a guarantee
against the aggression from which she bed been suffering
for one hundred years, a guarantee which she still sorely
needed.
To Walsh, as to others. Article 10 was truly the soul
of the Covenant.

He believed that it was the one guarantee

of peace which the Covenant contained.

Some, he said, had

protested that in case of a Bulgarian attack on Roumania,
American boys would have to go to that area end fight
against Bulgaria.

If such a thing happened, he said.
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• • .the hoys of Great Britain would equally have to
to— «Indeed, the boys from every part of the far-flung
British m p l r e , as well .as the boys of France and Italy
'and Spain and Norway and Denmark, of Brazil and Argen
tina, with those of half a hundred lesser nations—
and Bulgaria, in that situation would probably take
council with herself and determine that after all It
would be more profitable to submit whatever differ
ences she may have with Roumania to the arbitrament
of the council of the League.
Moreover, Walsh asserted that the United States was
at all times the final voice In the fulfillment of any obli
gation under the League of Nations.

Article 10, he urged,

did not usurp the powers of Congress.

He believed that the

United States was morally but not legally bound to follow
the advice of the Council, and that Congress Itself would
always determine whether our obligations were justified by
the occasion.

Furthermore, he said. It would be up to

Congress to decide in what manner the United States should
carry out whatever obligations it chose to assume.
In conclusion, Welsh maintained that peace in the
world could only be preserved If the united nations of the
world would be willing to pit their forces behind such a
program of peace and order end by an agreement such as that
manifested by Article 10, wherein the nations agreed to
cooperate as the occasion might demand.

The League of

Nations, he said,
recognized the Inveterate character of greed, vanity,
selfishness, and allied vices In humanity— In nations
as well as in Individuals. They now assert themselves,
restrained, only feebly, perhaps, by the precepts of
the Gospel or an Intelligent perception of self
interest. The League attempts only to add, in the
case of nations, the coercion which even primitive
man found essential to his welfare In the case of
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the members of his little oonmiunity.
It is plain that senator Welsh wes a valuable asset
to the Wilson Administration in the League of Rations con
troversy.

Article 10 had been the object of much declama

tion, especially by such Individuals as Borah, Gronna and
Poindexter.

Walsh argued with good reasoning that Article

10 would not be used for those things which the opponents
claimed, and he also presented good reasons for the exist
ence of such an article.

When he analysed the arguments

of the opposition

in respect to Ireland, he probably told

the truth when be

characterized the motives behind such

opposition, and he also disclosed the basic inconsistency
of those arguments.
Walsh furthermore commendably admitted that the
United States, as a world power, was no better than any
of the. other nations of the world, and that this country
would be no more obligated by the League of Nations than
any other member.

He was aware of the need, in fact of

the necessity, of

international cooperation if there was

to be any hope for the preservation of peace.
The other senators, notably Johnson and Nugent, were
also cognizant of a new age in world history and they were
both aware of the lack of wisdom and foresight in isolation.
Of these two, Nugent was the more outstanding in that he
departed from the general aspects of the question and, like
Walsh, attempted to defend certain of the Articles and im
plications of the issue which had been subject to hostile
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criticism.

Ee was anxious to point out that Congressional

ascendency would not be jeopardized and to state his belief
that the vital interests of the United States were suffi
ciently protected in the Covenant itself.

This was a

typically Democratic stand, and perhaps the correct one,
but Nugent, again like Walsh, and like Myers, was not so
bound to his party that he would not compromise with the
uncompromising Republicans when the votes were casfl
Johnson, however, could not resist a more partisan atti
tude in his speeches, and remained throughout one of those
loyal Democrats whose party allegiance prevented ratifies- j
tlon of the treaty.
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cowcnjsioN
The League of Nations controversy In the United Ltates
reveals one significant truth.

This was the fact that, since

the debates in the Senate were essentially partisan in char
acter, and since they lasted for a long and inconclusive
fifteen months, the United States was not ready to forsake
those isolationists policies which it had adhered to for so
many decades.

In the Senate, most of these debates were be

tween those who would ratify the treaty as internationalists
and those more isolationist members who preferred only
limited obligations by this country in the L e e ^ e of Na
tions.

It is significant that the former opinion was

confined mostly to the members of the Republican party,
While deliberating over the implications of the issue, the
United States became less interested in membership in in
ternational organization than in what manner it should
participate in such a system if it chose to do so.
Many senators eloquently and without regard for party
affiliation, pleaded the cause of internationalism and for
American participation in a system which they believed would
preserve the peace among nations.

But even in the case of

these men, most of their energies were devoted to the attempt
to refute or repudiate the overpowering persuasiveness of
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those who appealed, for whatever reasons, to the basic iso
lationism of the American people.

Considered in the light

of the long and confused sessions of the Senate, with its
forces of partisanship and personal animosities, and along
side the waning public enthusiasm for an active American
interest in foreign affairs, such far-sighted arguments as
those of Walsh, Me Cumber and others were futile.

It may be

reiterated with much truth that
the recrudescence of isolation was felt. . .in the
Senate. The extent to which it influenced individual
senators cannot be measured.
But it can be asserted
with as much certainty as is possible in human affairs
that a sincere belief based on the merits of the issue
was not the dominant cause of the Senate's action.^
One indication of the lack of a "sincere belief based
on the merits of the issue" was the struggle for party as
cendency.

Politics did not stop at the water's edge.

The

battle over reservations was what killed the treaty, and
whether they were necessary or not, it was the Republicans
who supported them and most of the Democrats who opposed
them.

£uch a division on party lines cannot easily be

explained away.
When the Covenant in its final form was presented to
the Senate, the work of the Administration had, in a sense,
been completed.

The Democrats, under Wilson, were from

there on mainly on the defensive.

They believed that the

Covenant would accomplish the purpose for which it had been

Stull Eolt, 307,
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designed, end they also believed that the United States would
be in no wise endangered if it should ratify it as it stood.
It is possible, all things considered, that if this very same
Covenant had been drafted by a Republican administration,
many Republicans would have felt the same way about it.

But

when it did reach the Senate, it was the irreconsilebles,
mostly Republicans, and the strong reservatlonlsts who took
it up from there.

The purpose of the former group was

wholly to defeat the treaty outright and to prevent the
United States from entering into any kind of league what
ever.

The reservatlonlsts, however, all were willing that

the Senate ratify the treaty, but in most oases a good many
concessions had to be made before they would cast their
votes in the affirmative.

No doubt some of these men were

sincere when they maintained that certain American institu
tions should receive a more air-tight protection than that
provided in the Covenant Itself.

This was particularly

true of the mild reservatlonlsts, who were much less con
servative or reactionary than the strong reservatlonlsts,
and who were much more favorable to ratification of the
treaty.

But none the less, they were all Republicans end,

as a party, they clung together.
However, if the reservations are examined, they
might be found much less harmful than their opponents be
lieved them to be and, from a practical point of view,
probably less necessary than their more ardent defenders
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2
claimed.

iUrthermore» eu oh mild réservâtlone as those of

MoCumher end those which the Democrats were for a time
willing to adopt, were not essentially different from those
of Lodge which dealt with the same subjects, end about
which moet of the controversy was centered.^

It was there

fore the stubbornness of Wilson which prevented a suffi
cient number of Democrats from compromising on these
matters.

By the time the treaty was voted upon in November,

1919, practically all the Republicans were irrevocably en
trenched and more important, the public had definitely
come to approve the reservations.

It was therefore only

party allegiance or subserviency to Wilson which thereafter
caused most of the Democrats to stand fast as they did and.
In fact, to defeat the treaty.^

Many of the Democrats, in

other words, may be held responsible for their failure to
realize that compromise was a characteristic means of
attaining ends in our democratic society.
Many Republicans, however, may also be charged with
a few shortcomings.

The League Covenant bore no marks

which were peculiarly Democratic or Wilsonian in character.
There was therefore no excuse for any Republican, regard
less of his stand, to be motivated by partisan sympathies

2yor a critical examination of the Lodge reservations,
see Bailey, The Great Betrayal, 154-67.
See also David
Jayne Hill, TPhe Senate’s service to the Nation,” North
American Review, C C U (January, 1920), 16,
^Bailey, The Greet Betrayal. 170-2,
4lbld,. 187-9, 272,
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OP by personal animosity toward the President,

To what ex

tent such sentiments did motivate the Republicans Is In
many cases problematical, but the League Covenant, which
was certainly designed for a worthy purpose, should have
been considered on its own merits, end not in regard to
whom or to what party was responsible for its inception.
It is obvious that Senator Lodge end many others had
Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic party uppermost in
mind when they chose to deal wlthvthe Covenant as they

dld,^
There were also those Republicans who, as noted, were
probably sincere in believing that the League of Nations
should be considered very cautiously end with due regard
to the welfare of American institutions.

They were isola

tionists at heart, that is, such a revolutionary idea was
too much for them to accept without putting up some kind
of opposition.

If this attitude is difficult to pin down

as essentially Republican in character, it can only be
said that many Democrats might have taken the same stand
were it not for the loyalty which they felt they owed to

^ h e best indication of Lodge’s motives in his own
book. The Senate end the League of Nations. Lodge states in
one instance that there was one thing which he had "very
much at heart, and that was that if we were successful in
putting on reservations we should create a situation where.
If the acceptance of the treaty was defeated, the Democratic
party, end especially Mr. Wilson’s friends should be respon
sible for its defeat, and not the opponents of the treaty
who were trying to pass it in a form safe for the United
States." Ibid,. 164. See also Fleming, 474ff; Bailey,
The Great Betrayal, 65-71.
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the party end to their leader, Woodrow Wilson.

With the ex

ception of Grover Cleveland, Wilson had been the first Demo
crat as well as the first southerner to be elected president
since the Civil War.

It could be argued, therefore, that

the Democrats had their hour, and that they had to make the
most of it.
paradoxically, it was the irreconcilables, a minority
group, who triumphed in the end.

They could not have de

feated the treaty by themselves, but because of the politi
cal differences of the other groups, they emerged as the
final spokesmen of the attitude which was to mould the
policies of the United States for a good many years to come.
The Northwest senators, as representatives of the
several factions of the senate of 1919, offer good examples
of the various kinds of personalities which figured in the
great dispute of that year.

From the most confirmed of

isolationists to the most vociferous champions of inter
national cooperation, many motives, personal, moral and
political, ere revealed in the attitudes of these men.
imong the irreconcilables and strong reservatlonlsts, there
were those who betrayed rather jealous dispositions, and
then there were others of the same group whose sincerity
would be more difficult to question.

On the other hand,

among the friends of the League, certain of them stand out
as the more profoundly convinced that the United States
should openly participate with the other nations in this
ambitious effort to ensure future peace.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

126
The moet memorable of the Northwest senators, perhaps
the most memorable of all the senators, was Borah of Idaho,
the "soul of the irreconcilables,"

The United States, as

seen by Borah, was that United States which was dedicated
to a noble proposition.

To him, therefore, the hope of

this country end, in a sense, of the world, lay not in a
tribunal run by the "gathered scum of the nations," but in
those hallowed principles of liberty, equality and demo
cracy which, in its efforts, the United States so wonder
fully embodied and exemplified.

He believed that, if the

United States should join the League of Nations, the
principles of this nation would be contaminated or tainted
by those Old World institutions which were the very anti
thesis of Americanism.

He never contended that the United

States, as a democratic nation, was without shortcomings of
its own, but he believed that it was the basic principles
upon which this nation had been founded that were the sole
means by which it could work out its own great destiny.
The League of Nations, in short, would have given the
death knell to those righteous endeavors which the United
States alone, it seemed, was capable of putting forth.
Among the opponents of Wilson, Borah stood alone in
one significant respect.

Throughout the stormy career of

the treaty, none was more profoundly opposed to it, and
none was so obviously sincere as he.

Like many other sena

tors, he freely flaunted such controversial issues as the
Irish question, British "designs" and imperialism, and
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Shantung,

To what extent these things really concerned him

is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, but whatever
the justification of their use, it could be maintained that
Borah’s personal and honest fear for the fate of his re
public excused the means by which he chose to defend it.
Then too, he "unjustices" which werecembodied in these
issues were, in fact, out of keeping with his own professed
convictions.

His was basically a moral complaint, and as

such would have been difficult to refute.
With regard to the other Northwest senators of the
Borah camp— Gronna and Poindexter— other features are
noticeable,

senator Gronna*s opposition was of a milder,

or rather a shallower sort than that of Borah, although he
was no doubt honest.

He had been an isolationist and paci

fist during the war, and these considerations were not in
consistent with his later stand against the League.

Poin

dexter, however, cut a different figure from both the others.
His speeches on the League were pervaded by a spirit of
bitterness end vindictiveness, and the observer cannot help
but question the purposes for which he invoked such isola
tionist shibboleths as the figures of Washington or Monroe
or, for that matter his brandishing of anything else which
he claimed was symbolic of our threatened American Republic.
Poindexter was a strongly partisan Republican, and
as such he took his stand against the League of Nations.
His opening attack in February, 1919, was certainly one of
defiance, and it was something more than stupidity which
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led hlm to brand the Covenant as a Southern conspiracy to
avenge the South’s defeat of 1865.

It would appear. In

short, that Poindexter’s opposition to the Covenant was
one against something peculiarly bothersome and. In parti
cular, against something Wilsonian.
The strong reservatlonlsts beer some resemblance to
the Irreconcilable senators,

were It not for the Lodge

reservations, which rendered the treaty harmless to their
satisfaction, most probably none of them would have voted
In Its favor.

It was their marked reluctance. In fact

their virtual refusal, to abandon any of the traditional
American policies which closely related them to the frank
opponents of the treaty.
Among these men. Senators Sterling and Warren were
without doubt possessed of a righteous concern for the
welfare of this country when they chose to stand as they
^

did.

Senator Jones might have shared the same feelings,

but he spoke also as a Republican and as a bitter opponent
of Wilson.

It Is obvious that he was willing to ratify

the treaty, but he wanted it his way or not at all.
Both of these groups— irreconcilables and strong
reservatlonlsts— shared many things in common.

The strong

reservatlonlsts were isolationists at heart In that they
were noticeably apprehensive over the unprecedented step
which, it seemed, the United States was about to take.
of them, moreover, spoke as conservative Americans, un
willing or unable to realize that the spirit which they
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reflected was that of a day that had passed.

The one group,

the irreconcilables, strove with adamant determination to
preserve the old ways and to prevent the inauguration of the
new.

The other group, the strong reservatlonlsts, were al

most equally determined to preserve the old, and only with
great reluctance were they ready to accept the proposed new
order.
As revealed in their speeches before the Senate, or
by their support of the Lodge reservations, the members of
these groups also shared the same feelings on more speci
fic issues.

They were all strongly determined that the

Monroe Doctrine should remain in force as the unilateral
American policy in the Western Hemisphere.

(Jones, for

example, had gone so far as to declare the Monroe Doctrine
to be an American domestic policy.)

They were, implicitly

or explicitly, keenly distrustful of the nations with which
the United States would have to deal as a member of the
League of Nations, and they were at all times determined
that nothing ever was to threaten or usurp the supreme
sovereignty of the United States when it came to any ques
tion which they believed was vital to its own interests.
They were also very reluctant, to say the least, to assume
without all kinds of limitations the "vest and incalculable
obligation" which Article 10, for example, seemed to impose
upon the members of the League.

Article 10 seemed to them

more likely to foment trouble or war than to guarantee a
reasonable peace.
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In the déclamations of these senators, many of their
misgivings and complaints were far-fetched and, at times,
inconsistent and irrelevant,

Poindexter, for example, once

said that the facility with which boundary disputes had been
settled between the United states and Great Britain was one
of the reasons which precluded the necessity of a league of
nations.

Yet months later, he claimed that the same Great

Britain might attempt to lay claim to several counties in the
state of Maine and that the friends of Great Britain on the
Assembly would most likely support such a claim.

The proba

bility that Great Britain would have considered such a thing
could be questioned, and it might also be asked who were the
friends of Great Britain on the Assembly who would have sup
ported such a claim if it were made.

All these senators,

moreover, were anxious that the other nations of the world
be excluded from any jurisdiction in the western Hemisphere,
and that the United States should in turn either refuse or
consider extremely carefully its own interference in the
affairs of the rest of the world.

Yet at the same time half

of them were perfectly willing to plunge into the purelyBritish Irish affair and they ell expressed strong concern
over the Japanese retention of interests in China's shan
tung,^

Borah, for example, who so consistently harangued

^Gronna, Jones and Borah each supported the Irish
reservation of March, 1920.
Congressional Record, 66 Con
gress, 2 Session, LIZ, 4532.
Sterling, however, consi
dered the Irish question to be irrelevant. Ibid., 4506.
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against a system which would embroil this country in the
quarrels of Europe, was practically ready to fight Japan on
behalf of China.^
Obviously, the irreconsilables were using every
possible means at their disposal to brand the Covenant
(which carried with it the treaty of peace) as an instru
ment of oppression and injustice as well as a terrible
danger to this country.

Their purpose was solely to defeat

it, and not to defend it or strive for improvements in a
type of document which they certainly knew was incapable
of perfection.

The strong reservatlonlsts were also off

the trajck when they undertook to worry over the fete of
Shantung or, as did Warren, over the Italian claim to
Flume.

They never admitted that such things as the Shan

tung and flume settlements were international questions,
and as such could have been amicably settled by the League
of Nations itself.

These concerns were irrelevant and in

consistent, if well meant.
The mild reservatlonlsts in the Northwest, Senators
MoNary and LieCumber, were undoubtedly the most openly avowed
friends of the League of Nations among all the leservationlsts
in the Senate.

In fact, their long pleas for international

cooperation are indistinguishable from the equally earnest
pleas of many of the Democrats.

Differing from others,

their purpose in adopting reservations was to sooth popular

^Daily, The Greet Betrayal. 162-3.
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misgivings as wall as the fears, real or pretended, of many
of the other senators.

It is a matter for some conjecture

whether reservations to the treaty should have been adopted,
but when McKary and McCumber did back a number of the Lodge
reservations, they stopped at that point.

Differing again

from the other reservationists, especially the stronger ones,
they spoke from there on as ardent internationalists, and
not as conservative Americans or isolationists.

Each of

these men did his best to refute the arguments of the oppo
nents of the League end to convince everyone that withdrawal
from the affairs of the world was both'immoral and improvi
dent.

To be sure, they were not themselves unconcerned with

such issues as the Monroe Doctrine, domestic questions and
national sovereignty, but they were much less fearful than
other senators that such things would be endangered if the
United Ltatea should join the League.

Also, they supported

the Covenant in the only spirit in which such a thing should
have been supported— with the avowed and unequivocal convic
tion that a League of Nations was necessary if the peace cf
the world was to be preserved.
McCumber was undoubtedly the most exemplary of all
the senators, at least among those who were friendly to the
League.

At the very beginning he practically deserted his

own party and pleaded for American participation in the
League when only a handful of the Republicans could possibly
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have shown signs of sympathy for the newly-created Covenant*®
And in later days he took a rather lonely stand as the only
Repuhlioan on the foreign Relations Committee to defend the
treaty as an instrument of good instead of.treating it as
something dangerous or evil.

£o anxious was be to see the

treaty ratified that he, as the only Republican, was willing
to support it both with and without the reservations*
Closely related to MoNary and McCumber were the North
west Democrats, notably Walsh, Nugent and Johnson.

Each of

these men also foresaw the exigencies of a later age and
they were also aware that the splendor and wisdom of isola
tion were things of the past.

Walsh distinguished himself

by his compromising spirit when he pleaded with the mass of
Democrats in the Senate not to kill the treaty Just because
the Lodge reservations were attached.^

And Nugent also, in

March, 1919, actually supported most of the Lodge reserva
tions, no doubt acting in the same spirit as had Walsh.
Johnson, however, was one of the three Democrats from
north of the Mason and Dixon line who was unwilling to
compromise with the Republicans, but he did recognize, as
did the others, that a concerted international effort was
necessary if peace in the world was to be maintained.

The

®0n the very day on which the Round Robin was signed,
McCumber made a long speech in favor of the League. This was
even before the first draft of the Covenant had been revised.
Congressional Record. 65 Congress, 3 session, LVII, 4872-82.
9Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIX, 4581.
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remarks of Senator Myers were most likely of dubious value
in

80

far as any effect upon the Senate was concerned, but

Myers also was of an impartial mind when he chose to support
the reservations "in the Interest of compromising and getting
together."
If these senators— the Democrats and the mild reser
vationists— appear to have repudiated the arguments or the
philosophies of the irreconcilables, or if. In their atti
tudes, they appear to have transcended either of the stronger
and more conservative groups, the latter none the less re
mained unaffected from beginning to end.

Many of the re

marks of Walsh, Nugent, MoNary or McCumber were made as
challenges to the attacks of other senators, but through
out the controversy the others remained entrenched and im
pervious.

In fact, it was a number of the Democrats who,

in later days, showed the greater propensity to compro
mise.^®

Needless to say, however, too few of them showed

such willingness as would have ratified the treaty.
In an attempt to discover in what degree these North
west senators reflected the sentiments of their constitu
ents, or in what manner they represented any regional
sentiments, a number of paradoxes would render such a task
difficult to undertake.

To begin with, in the case of North

Dakota, there were two senators, both Republicans, one of
whom was a confirmed opponent of the League, end the other

lOsailey, The Great Betrayal. 262-3, 271-2.
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one of the most vociferous champions of ratification.

It

would be difficult to assume that Gronna*s opposition was
a typically North Dakota opposition, and that üCCUmber's
opposite views stemmed from the same basic temperament.
Moreover, when the legislature of North Dakota sub
mitted Its petitions for ratification to the United states
Senate, it did not do so by way of McCumber, but by way of
Gronna,

who ignored its a d v i c e . A l s o when

ture of Idaho presented its petition against

the legisla
ratification.

It did so through Senator Nugent of that state, who ignored
Its precepts and acted, as he pleased, in supporting the
treaty.

12
Furthermore, when President Bllson made his famous

tour of the west, he did so to appeal to the

people on be

half of his Covenant which, at that time, September, 1919,
was suffering all kinds of opposition in the Senate.

But

the reception which Wilson received, especially in the
Northwest, would serve again to indicate that the senators
were individuals, and did not necessarily have their con
stituents behind them.^^

In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, the

ovation was so generous and warm-hearted that it was obvious

^^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 49-50; Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIZ, 1208,
IBçoneressional Peoord. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 132.
^^For an account of this Journey, see Bailey, The
Great Betrayal. 101-10.
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that the people of that area did not share the sentiments of
their own Senator Borah,

And in the cities of Spokane,

Seattle end Tacoma, in Washington, the reception given
Wilson was of such an intense jubilance as to approach fan
aticism.

Here again was a population which did not harbor

the strong feelings of Poindexter or Jones.
And, significantly, while Wilson was making this
seemingly successful appeal, Borah and Poindexter, among
others, took to the stumps in an effort to neutralize what
ever affects Wilson’s journey might have had.

Borah spoke

at Chicago, the anti-Wilson city which Wilson had avoided,
and Poindexter made his appeal farther east,

14

Borah, of course, was the most ardent of all the
anti-league senators in his own hatred for the League.

He

might well not have faltered in his promise when he an
nounced, on one occasion, that he would have opposed the
thing even if Christ Himself were on earth and favored
it.

15

But he also made another statement which was most

probably endorsed by a good many of the other senators:
I shall not remain silent out of fear of being called
a carping critic, . .1 know of no higher duty devolving
upon a Senator than. . .to advocate his own beliefs and
his own views.

l^ibld.. 127-8,
^^Hamilton Holt, "The Senate Versus the People,"
Independent. ICVIII (June 7, 1919), 551-2.
^ ^Congreeslonal Record. 65 Congress, 3 Session,
LVII, 2425.
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It wee, i n reality, the United States Senate which
rejected the League of Nations.

The American people approved

of the Covenant in one form or another and in due time their
enthusiasm waned.

But it was the long end heated debates in

the Senate which caused the public's attitude to change, and
it was the long and indecisive deadlock which caused the
people eventually to become indifferent to the fate of the
League*

The Senate, as a body, was not preoccupied with

the rest of the world, and because it was unwilling to look
outward and ahead, and to forget that it was dealing with a
subject which was peculiar to no party or person, the League
of Nations on its own merits remained throughout an almost
secondary issue.
That the United States should have joined the League
of Nations would now be less easily disputed.

American

membership in that organization would not necessarily have
prevented the Second World War, nor would it necessarily
have altered or prevented other things which were to come.
But such gains would not have been impossible of attainment,
end the United States would probably have had little to
lose.

The efforts of this country might well have had, as

Senator Thomas Sterling hoped, "a stabilizing and steadying
effect upon the conditions there."
The Northwest senators who participated in this, the
greatest debate in the history of the senate, are now passed
and gone.

But looking backward, the orations of a number of

them stand out above all the others as examples of foresight
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and concern for the welfare of this nation as well as of the
world.

The necessity of world organization, as preached by

all the defenders of the League, is now fully appreciated,
and many of the dire predictions of Johnson, Nugent and
McCumber have also been realized and might yet be more com
pletely fulfilled.

The League of Nations was crippled at

birth, but the later realization that such a thing was the
only hope for the world will recall the prophetic words of
Senator McCumber so many years ago:
All that we can be sure of is that tne instrument
comes to us as a compromise, and in it is the soul of
a future world freedom. It is within our power to
strangle the body, but the soul will live and ever
seek reembodiment in some future International or
ganization.
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TH2 COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS^
Article 1
Section 3. Any member of the League may, after two
years* notice of its intention to do so, withdraw from the
League, provided that all its international obligations and
all its obligations under this covenant shall have been ful
filled at the time of its withdrawal.

Article 5
Section 1, Except where otherwise expressly provided
in this covenant, or by the terms of this treaty, decisions
at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall re
quire the agreement of all the members of the League repre
sented at the meeting.

Article 8
Section 1, The members of the League recognize that
the maintenance of a peace requires the reduction of national
armaments to the lowest point consistent with the national
safety and the enforcement by common action of international
obligations.
Section 2, The Council, taking account of the geo
graphical situation end circumstances of each State, shall
formulate plans for the consideration and action of the
several Governments.
Section 5. The members of the League undertake
interchange full end frank information as to the scale
their armaments, their military and naval programs and
condition of such of their industries as are adaptable
warlike purposes.

to
of
the
to

^Taken from "Full Text of the Revised Covenant of the
League of Nations," Current History. I (June, 1919), 509-15.
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Article 10
The members of the League undertake to respeot and
preaerre as against external aggression the territorial in
tegrity and existing political independence of all the mem
bers of the League.
In case of any such aggression or in
case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall
be fulfilled.

Article 11
Section 1. Any war or threat of war, whether imme
diately effecting any of the members of the League or not,
is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League,
and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise
and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case
any such emergency should arise, the Secretary General shall,
on the request of any member of the League, forthwith
summon a meeting of the Council.
Section _2. It is also declared to be the fundamental
right of each member of the League to bring to the attention
of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever
affecting International relations which threatens to disturb
either the peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.

Article 15
Section %. If the dispute between the parties is
claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise
out of a matter which by international law is solely within
the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall
so report end shall make no recommendations as to its settle
ment.
Section 8. The Council may in any case under this
article refer the dispute to the Assaably. The dispute shall
be 80 referred at the request of either party to the dispute,
provided that such request is made within fourteen days after
the submission of the dispute to the Council.
Section 9, In any ease referred to the Assembly all
the provisions of this article and of Article H I relating
to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the
action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report
made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representatives
of those members of the League represented on the Council
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and of a majority of the other members of the League, ezoluaive In each case of the representatives of the parties
to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by
the Council concurred In by all the members thereof other
than the representatives of one or more of the parties to
the dispute*

Article 21
Nothing In this covenant shall be deemed to effect the
validity of International engagements such as treaties of ar
bitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine
for securing the maintenance of peace.
THE LODGE RESERVATIONS
"(Those of November, 1919 appear unlndanted; those of
March, 1920, were exactly the same, except that the Italicized
and bracketed passages were deleted, and the Indented passages
were added. • . • For originals, see Cong. Record. 66 Cong.,
1 seas., p. 0773; Ibid.. 2 eess., p. 4599.)"%
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present oonourflng therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded
at Versailles on the 23th day of June, 1919, subject to the
following reservations and understandings, which are hereby
made a pert and condition of this resolution of ratifica
tion, which ratification Is not to take effect or bind the
United States until the said reservations and understandings
adopted by the Senate have been accepted /by an exchange of
notes as _a part and a condition of this resolution of rati
fication by at least three of the four principle alTled
and associated powers, to wî7. Great Britain. France. Italy.
end Japan; /
as a part and a condition of this resolution of rati
fication by the allied and associated powers and a
failure on the part of the allied end associated
powers to make objection to said reservations and
understandings prior to the deposit of ratification
by the United States shall be taken as a full and
final acceptance of such reservations and under
standings by said powers:
1. The United States so understands and construes
article 1 that In case of notice of withdrawal from the
league of nations, as provided In said article, the United

^As arranged and explained by Bailey, The Great
Betrayal. 387-92,
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States shall be the sole Judge aa to whether all its Inter
national obligations and all its obligations under the said
covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by
the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution
of the Congress of the United States,
2, The United States assumes no obligation to pre
serve the territorial integrity or political independence
of any other country/or to interfere in controversies be
tween natione— whether members of the league or not--un?er
the provisions of article 10."or to employ the military or
naval forces of the United States under any article of tïïê
treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case tE'e"
Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power
to declare war or authorize the employment of thelmlTitery
or naval forces of the United States, shall by act.or joint
resolution so provide. 7
by the employment of its military or naval forces, its
resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or
to interfere in any way in controversies between nations,
including all controversies relating to territorial In..têgrity or apolitical Independence, whether members of the
league or not, under the provisions of article 10, or
to employ the military or naval forces for any purpose,
unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under
the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or
authorize the employment of the military or naval forces
of the United states, shall in the exercise of full
liberty of action, by act or Joint resolution so provide.

4. The United states reserves to itself exclusively
the right to decide what questions are within its domestic
Jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political
questions relating wholly or in part to Its internal affairs,
including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff,
commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children
end opium and other dangerous drugs, end all other domestic
questions, ere solely within the Jurisdiction of the United
States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any
way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the
council or of the assembly of the league of nations, or
any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation
of any other power.
5. The United States will not submit to arbitration
or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the
league of nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any
questions which in the Judgment of the United States depend
upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly
known as the Monroe doctrine; said doctrine is to be in-
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terpreted by the United States alone and la hereby declared
to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of na
tions and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in
the said treaty of peace with Germany.
6.
The United States withholds Its assent to articles
156, 157, end 158 /regarding Shantung/, and reserves full
liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may
arise under said articles /between the Republic of China
end the Empire of Japan/.

10. /If the United States shell at any time adopt
any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the
council of the league of nations under the provisions of
article 8,
reserves the right to increase such armaments
without the consent of the council whenever the United
States Is threatened with Invasion or engaged in war. /
No plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the
council of the League of Nations under the provisions of
article 8 shall be held as binding the United states
until the seme shall have been accepted by Congress, and
the United States reserves the right to Increase Its
armament without the consent of the council whenever the
United States Is threatened with Invasion or engaged in
war.

14.
/The United States assumes no obligation to be
bound by any election, decision, report, or finding of the
council or assembly In v/hlch any member of the league end '
Its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire.
In the aggregate have oast more than one vote, end assumes
no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or find
ings of the council or eesembly arising out of any ?Tspute
between the United States end any member of the league If
such Q member, or any self-governing dominion, oblony, em
pire ."“or part of empire united with it politically has voted./
Until Part I, being the covenant of the League of Nations,
shall be so amended as to provide that the United states
shall be entitled to cast a number of votes equal to that
which any member of the league end Its self-governing
dominions, colonies, or parts of empire. In the aggregate
shall be entitled to oast, the United States assumes no
obligation to be bound, except in cases where Congress
has previously given Its consent, by any election, de
cision, report, or finding of the council or assembly In
which any member of the league and Its self-governing
dominions, colonies, or parts of empire In the aggregate
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hare cast more than one vote.
The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by
any decision, report, or finding, of the council or
assembly arising out of any dispute between the United
States and any member of the league if such member, or
any self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of
empire united with it politically has voted.
15.
In consenting to the ratification of the treaty
with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of
self-determination end to the resolution of sympathy with
the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of
their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and
declares that when such government is attained by Ireland,
a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly
be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.
ZNDOR&mENT OF THE LEAGUE
BY THE NORTH DAKOTA
»3
STATE LEGISLATURE
Department of State
State of North Dakota
To all to whom these presents shall come?
I, Thomas Hall, secretary of state for the state of
North Dakota, do hereby set forth and certify that the
following is the full text and the whole thereof of a cer
tain concurrent resolution adopted by the sixteenth legis
lative assembly of the State of North Dakota.
Dated at the capital in Bismarck, N. Dak., this 3d
day of March, 1919.
/Seal_y
Thomas Hall,
Secretary of state.
Concurrent resolution favoring the establishment of
a league of nations to enforce peace, and aim at promoting
the liberty, progress, and orderly development of the world,
Whereas the war now brought to a victorious close by the
associated power of the free nations of the world was
above all else a war to end war and protect human
rights; Therefore be it
«

'^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 49-50.
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Resolved by the Senate of the State of North Dakota (the
House of Representatives Conourrlnf?;) « That we favor the
establishment of a league of nations of which the United
States shall be a member.
We believe that such a league
should elm at promoting the liberty, progress, and orderly
development of the world; that it should clinch the victory
won at such terrible sacrifice by having the united potential
force of all its members as a standing menace against any
nation that seeks to upset the peace of the world; be it
further
Resolved, that certified copies of this resolution be
sent by the secretary of state to the President and to the
presiding officers of both branches of Congress and to
each of the United States Senators and Representatives from
the State of North Dakota.
SECOND NORTH DAKOTA RESOLUTION
United states of America,
Department of State,
State of North Dakota.
To all to whom these presents shall come;
I, William J. Prater, secretary of the senate of the
special session of the Sixteenth Legislative Assembly of
the State of North Dakota, do hereby declare and certify
that the following concurrent resolution was introduced in
the senate by Senator Thorwald Mostad; was passed by the
senate December 10, 1919, and concurred in by the house of
representatives December 10, 1919.
Dated at Bismarck, N. Dak., this 10th day of December,
A.D., 1919.

/Sealjf
William J. Prater
Secretary of the senate
Concurrent Resolution
Be it resolved by the Senate, the house of representa
tives concurring.
Recognizing and commending the splendid service President
Wilson rendered to his country and to all mankind through
his untiring efforts as a statesman to secure world peace,
we regret that his health and physical strength became ex
hausted before his work for peace of the world was completed.

^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 2 Session,
LIX, 1208,
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We ask for a apeedy ratification of the peace treaty
with only such reservations as are compatible with a binding
and bona fide participation by the United States of America
in the covenant of the league of nations. The honor of our
arms and our devotion to the principles of democracy demand
that Congress take action to bring about peace to a warweary world at the very earliest date possible.
Be it further resolved. That the secretary of state send
a copy of these resolutions to President Woodrow Wilson and
to each Member of Congress from North Dakota.
RESOLUTION AGAINST RATIFICATION
BY THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE^
State of Idaho,
Department of state.
I, Robert 0. Jones, secretary of state of the state
of Idaho, do hereby certify that the annexed is a full, true
and completetranscript
ofenrolled housejoint memorial No.
£0, which was filed inthis office on the 17th day of March,
Â.D., 1919, and admitted to record.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed the great seal of the state.
Done at Boise City, the
Capital of Idaho, this £8th day of April, A.D., 1919 and of
the independence of the United States of America the one
hundred and forty-third.

2seal_y
Robert 0. Jones
Secretary of State.
To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress Assembled;
Your memorialists, the House of Representatives end
Senate of theState
ofIdaho, respectfully represent that—
Whereassection 2,Article
II of the Constitution of the
United States gives the President power to make treaties
by end with the advice end consent of the senate; and
Whereas there is now In progress the greatest peace-nego
tiating conclave In the history of the world, the
United States being one of the members of said con
vention; and
Whereas the President of the United states has, contrary to

^Congressional Record. 66 Congress, 1 Session,
LVIII, 132.
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the wishes and desires of the majority of the people
of the United States of America, and without the advice
or consent of the Senate of the United states, attempted
to foist upon the American people as one of the essen
tial elements of the treaties of peace to be promulgated
by said convention a proposition favoring and organizing
a so-called league of nations; and
Whereas the substance of the proposed draft of the so-called
league of nations is obscure, vague, ambiguous, and tend
ing to bring about greater confusion and distrust and
hostility among the various nations of the world; and
Whereas the theory of said league of nations is impracticable,
visionary, and subversive of the international principle
heretofore controlling in the foreign relationships of
the United states of America; and
Whereas the President of the United States has defied Con
gress end the people of the United States to oppose the
organization of such a league of nations; and
Whereas some 37 Senators have pledged themselves to oppose
the ratification of a treaty adopting said league of
nations; now therefore, be it
Resolved. That we, the gouse of Representatives of the
State of Idaho, the Senate concurring, do earnestly request
and recommend that the Senate of the United States oppose
absolutely the theory as indicated by the constitution of
the league of nations and oppose said constitution of the
league of nations becoming a part of or being in any way in
cluded in the peace treaties to be made or entered into by
the United states; and be it further
Resolved. That they hereby ratify and give their un
qualified approval to the stand and position taken by the
above-mentioned 37 Senators in recording themselves as
opposed to said league of nations at the present time; end
be it further
Resolved. That they resent the defiant and dictatorial
attitude of the President of the United states in his recent
statements in which he has attempted to force his personal
views and opinions upon the people of the United States
irrespective of their desires in the matter.
The secretary of State of Idaho is hereby instructed to
forward this memorial to the Senate and House of Representa
tives of the United States of America, end to send copies of
the same to our Senators and Representatives in Congress.
This house joint memorial passed the house on the 6th
day of March, 1919.
M. A. Kiger,
Speaker of the House
of Representatives
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This house Joint memorial passed the senate on the 8th
day of March, 1919.

C.
C. Moore,
President of the Senate
I hereby certify that the within house Joint memorial No,
20 originated in the house of representatives during the
fifteenth session of the Legislature of the State of Idaho.
David Burrell,
Chief Clerk of the
House of Representatives
STATE COmiTTEEMEN OF TEE
LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE®
Idaho; Executive Committee, James Hawley, Boise;
National Committee, S. B. Hayes; ft. W. Deal, Master of the
Idaho State Grange, Nampa.
Montana: National Committee, F. S. Cooley, Director
of Extension, Montana State College, Bozeman; U. M. Donaghue,
Butte; Samuel V. Stewart, vice president, Helena.
North Dakota; Dr. E. F, Ladd, North Dakota College
of Agriculture; Louis B. Hanna, Fargo; Mrs. Frank fthite.
Valley City; vice presidents A. A. Bruce, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of North Dakota, and Lynn J. Frazier,
Bismarck.
Oregon; National Committee, W. J. Kerr, Pres.,
Agricultural College; Gen. F. Beebe, Portland, C. S* Jackson,
Portland; vice presidents James Wlthycombe, Salem and Henry
L. Corbett, Portland.
South Dakota; National Committee, ft. C. Allen,
Aberdeen; Mrs. Fred H. Hollister, Sioux Falls; Vice presi
dent Peter Norbcok, Pierre,
Washington; Executive Committee, Ernest Lister,
Olympia; National Committee, W. S. Thornber, Director of
Agricultural Extension, Pullman, Henry suzzalo, University
of Washington; William E. Cowles, Spokane; Mrs, Overton G.
Ellis, Tacoma; vice president J. E, Chilberg, Seattle.
Wyoming; National Committee, Mrs. Harnsberger,
Lander; Professor Harvey L. Eby, University of Wyoming;
Gibld.. 7483-6.
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vice presidents Robert D. Carey and frank L. Houz, Cheyenne.
PETITION FAVORING RATIFICATION?
(signed by representative citizens
of thirty-nine states)
Idaho;

ex-governor James H. Hawley

Montana:

Governor Samuel V. Stewart

North Dakota; Governor Lynn J. Frazier, and Dr.
Edwin F. Ladd, President of the Agricultural College of
North Dakota.
Oregon; Judge Charles H. Carey; Richard W. Montague;
Bishop Walter Taylor Sumner; William D. Wheelright.
South Dakota; Willis C. Cook, member National Rail
ways Commission; ex-governor and ex-United States Senator
Coe I. Crawford; Thomas 0*Gorman, Bishop of Sioux Falls;
Mrs. John H. Pyle, President, south Dakota Equal Suffrage
Society; H. K. Warren, President of Yankton College.
Washington; N. B. Coffman, president of the Wash
ington Bankers* Association; Charles w. Fasaet, Mayor of
Spokane; Bishop Frederick w. Keator; Josephine Carliss
Preston, President, National Education Association.
Wyoming; Harry W. Fox, President, State Federation
of Labor; Duncan McLeod, International Executive Board,
United Mine Workers of America; James Morgan, Secretary of
the Miners* Organization.

?Ibid.. 5363-5.
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